The EU Foreign and Security Policy after the Cold War: In Search of Identity and Role
Ozal Hopi

Abstract
The focus of this paper is on analyzing the European Union foreign and security policy after the Cold War. Following the academic literature, and the treaties that emerged in the post-bipolar world, the EU was led to be a purely civilian power. Therefore, the aim is to prove that the Unions’ foreign and security policy follow civilian manner. Yet, the main conclusion drawn from this study is that the civilian foreign policy that the EU holds has contributed to various high political and security failures. Accordingly, the paper shall discuss in details the defence policy as relates to the policy stand of the EU, and the collaboration with the hard power spheres like the US. As a result, with the assumption of the EU-US historical partnership, and their common belief in the Western style of Liberal-Democratic values, the paper realises that in order to bring harmony within the international affairs, or specifically international security, there is a need for the two major players to work hand in hand.
Introduction:

European Union foreign policy is one of the most complicated research areas of international affairs. The Unions’ sui generis institutional structure, lack of military assets and incoherent intra-behaviour makes it a complex area. Yet, post-Cold war environment was demanding, and required restructuring of the Eastern economies and stability within the all old continent. Such complex and demanding environment led many to seek for an exploration of the EU actorness in the international sphere (See Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Kagan 2004; Moravcsik 2010; Sjursen 2004). The conventional wisdom was generally categorised into two mainstream approaches, that of realist perception of the world order consisting of high politics and state presence, and intergovernmentalists who focus on the EU’s soft power. In this respect, the former suggest that the EU is a weak international actor because of its lack of military assets. The latter, however, seek to explore the EU’s institutional inconsistency and its implications on the international behaviour.

However, this paper argues that the recent literature poses more of a result oriented perception of the EU foreign policy, and they have neglected and underestimated the EU’s role in the international sphere. Key questions, thus, become: which internal and external factors promotes the EU’s role in global politics, and to what extent the EU is an actor in the international affairs. In attempting to answer these question, the paper declares that the politics of identity in the international affairs is the central problem for the union to solve, because identity gives (and shapes) practical behaviour. In this respect, this paper indicates that the EU’s identity is constructed by the instruments it uses, and objectives it seeks to achieve, Thus, the situational analysis of the EU foreign policy demonstrates that it is the best example of civilian power in the international community.

Yet, the Union has failed in many occasions to secure strong actorness in high politics cases such as Yugoslavian conflicts, Iraqi War and so forth. Thus, it is evident that the Union depends on the US hard power; where as Kagan (2004) claims; the US cooks and the EU does the dishes. As a result, realist inspired analysts claim that the EU is an ineffective international actor. However, this paper demonstrates that such claims are limited, because if we look at the ongoing wars in Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as the post-Yugoslavian era, it is not only hard power which matters, but post-war reconstruction is important too. Implying Kaganian rhetoric, it is evident that the US can’t cook without the EU doing the dishes.
Therefore, with the assumption of the EU-US historical partnership, and their common belief in the Western style of Liberal-Democratic values, the paper realises that in order to bring harmony in the international affairs, there is a need for the two major players to work hand in hand.

In this respect, the paper is structured as follows; first chapter will draw the EU’s international identity from instruments it uses and goals it seeks to achieve. Second chapter will demonstrate the Union in practice and its failures in the hard power sphere. Lastly, the emphasis will be given to the EU as a civilian power and it contributions to international affairs. As a result, it will be concluded that the EU’s civilian power is an asset in the international arena especially for the Western actors, as it is providing a complementary presence to the American hard power.

1. Conceptual framework: Constructing the EU’s International Identity

The development of theorising about the EU’s international presence has been tied to a discussion of what kind of international actor it is in terms of actions and affection. Mainly, the literature has been categorised into two strands: consisting of those who focus on the EUs’ actorness, and seeks to construct criteria of actor capability as a mean to explore whether the EU can be assessed as possessing actor capability (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Sjosted 2004). Other literature focuses on the EU’s sui generis presence, and seeks to explore the EU’s objectives in the international arena from role perspective (Duchene 1973; Manners 2002). Thus, the significance of these approaches is that they focused upon a (potentially) distinctive international role for the EU (Manners and Whitman 1998).

However, this literature lacks an insight about why they EU does, or focuses on a certain type of behaviour. In other words, the literature poses more of a result oriented perception of the EU’s foreign policy. Thus, the politics of identity is declared to be the central problem for the Union to solve, because as Cooper (2004) has observed; in comparative politics, identity precedes interest. In this respect, this paper contends that in order to understand why the EU poses a certain international behaviour, we need to ascribe an identity to the Union in international relations, as it gives implications to practical behaviour, which in turn can enable the observers to explore why it is behaving in a certain way in the international sphere.
Yet, understanding and conceptualising the EU’s international identity is a highly controversial research issue. Manners and Whitman (1998: 236) suggest that ascribing an international identity to the EU in international relations requires us to give an account at how it is constructed and represented internationally. Moreover, Ian Manners (2002) in his famous normative power emphasis, refer to the EU’s institutional complexity, and demonstrates that such complexity is affecting the Unions behaviour in the international arena. Bretherton and Vogler (2006), on another level, explores the idea of EU’s presence in international arena, that of being constructed by the Unions international behaviour, and external actors’ perception of it.

However, the weakness of such claims is that they exclusively focus on temporary factors, but lack insight about how the identity was historically constructed and represented. Thus, the paper indicates that the Union’s identity is constructed by the instruments it uses, and objectives it seeks to achieve. Whitman, writing in the late 1990s indicates that the international identity of the EU may be conceived in terms of the instruments available to the Union. In this respect, analyses (See Nicolaidis and Howse 2006; Orbie 2006) demonstrate that Francois Duchene’s notion of civilian power Europe has dominated the debate on Europe’s identity in the international sphere.

To Duchene, the Civilian power in the EU was due to the stalemate it had during the Cold War and the large political cooperation it wielded to exert all forms of civilian forms of power (Dechêne 1973: 32). Other views like those of Hanns Maull (1990; 2005) take civilian power to be the state where concept of foreign policy and behaviour are shaped by values, aims, principles and influences of civilisation of international relations. To Maull (1990; 2005), civilian power is the acceptance of the need to cooperate with others in the seeking of international objectives. It is also the use of non-military and economic means to secure the national goals, with military power being used as a residual instrument to safeguard other means of interaction. Lastly, it is the willingness to create supranational structures that critically address international management. Hence, the concept of civilian power depicts a kind of actor, means and relationships.

In practice, the ways in which the EU uses these means defines their foreign policy as a civilian power. This civilian power has made the EU be a major global actor, and making it a leader in diplomacy efforts, very generous aid donations and makes use of multilateral rules
to regulate international finance and trade. Such measures have led the Union have civilian relations with its members countries and other regions like Latin America and Africa. According to Freres (2008: 78), the EU as a civilian actor with Latin America can be seen from the use of diplomacy to strengthen the trade, economic and cultural links between the two. The same efforts have been used by the EU to assist countries within Africa through generous Aid donations.

Holsti (1995: 126) believes that the civilian capability of the EU can be linked to six ways in which it has been able to influence other international actors. This has been through persuasion where they try to obtain responses rather than use of punishments. The EU has also been known to offer rewards, grants as a means to obtain responses from member states and international community. In the international scene, countries use multilateral organisations like the EU, IMF or the World Bank to distribute their foreign aid and donations (Milner 2004: 34).

The EU as a multilateral organisation has been used on many occasions to act as a policing, reconstruction and aid donor. The reason why the EU is used by its member countries to perform these tasks is due to the fact that it is believed as a multilateral organisation it will be in a better position to give information and monitor the recipients of these instruments (Milner 2004: 42). On the other hand, it is believed that there is less political influence when the EU is used than when individual countries assist donor country (Peterson 2008: 204). In this process, the EU has been used by its member states to give assistance for the exercise of policy change. Yet, the Union has been seen to make use of donor aid and grants o influence economic and political purposes related to donor interests (Moravcsik 2002).

Aid and grants are also sent to reconstruct post conflict and disaster regions like Iraq, Afghanistan, Aceh Tsunami region, Bosnia and Kosovo and Sierra Leone conflicts among other regions (Rogerson 2004: 19). According to Youngs (2008: 292), the EU is a major civilian actor due to its ability to promote democracy and human rights through various instruments. The instruments or incentives like funding and grants have been perceived as the multilateral uses to influence democratic change in several regions like the Africa. Smith (2000: 21) concurs that the EU as a civilian actor is able to make use of civilian means of persuasion, to reach civilian ends where foreign policy making is under the influence of democratic control. However, not all EU states are purely civilian actors, but those we can
consider that are, are Germany, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria. These countries have had military operations within the UN but have been purely on a defence basis. Therefore, it is difficult to call the European Union as a purely civilian actor if its member states do have military operations within and without the region.

The EU also makes use of its foreign policy in policing missions within and without its borders. Such efforts can be seen within Bosnia and Herzegovina (Osland 2004: 31). In this respect, the Unions’ security strategy within this region is based on the assumption that through civilian instruments, they will be able to build democracy and control legitimately the executive power within these nations. The aim of the EU is to stop corruption and organised crime since the EU views this as counteractive to democracy (Rees 2005). They also view that if these measures are not taken, there will be detrimental consequences to the Bosnia and Herzegovina region and the EU region, and the overall security and defence policy of the EU.

As Benyon et al. (1993:162) demonstrates, there is widespread police cooperation within the EU. The research was able to look at the various police cooperation at all levels from boarder control, crime, immigration issues and the different EU policing strategies. There is an EU interest in the use of their foreign policy to direct policing aspects in the areas of organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, mobility of offenders, movement of goods and capital, victimisation and extradition (Rees 2005). Such policing structures that are used towards these efforts are Interpol that operates also internationally. The other policing groups entail forces like the Trevi Group, Schengen group, council of Europe and the Maastricht Treaty (Rees 2005; 2008). Through such bodies, the EU is able to control policing efforts through effective information and communication exchange and bilateral cooperation.

Above all, the European Union was able to gain its civilian identity after the Cold War, with the need at first to reduce the threat of war in Western Europe. This was achieved through the transformation of anarchic relations between the states to a law bound structure that looked like domestic politics. It was this experience and philosophy that drove the EU to have a foreign civilian policy that transcends all its functions from politics, economy, aid, policing and reconstruction. We can also view the civilian power of the EU through other dimensions. For example, looking at the EU’s enlargement policy, it can be closely associated with an
ideal civilian power with milieu policy (Aggestam 2008). Within this field, the EU has adopted a self interested possession of goals where it relies on its power attraction.

However, the EU has made use of various forms of coercion to influence states to become its members. Theorists like Vachudova (2005) believe that in the enlargement efforts, the EU was not purely civilian. This was seen through the EU efforts to enlarge with the coercion, like the use of force in forcing Bosnia-Herzegovina to have order. Though it used force in this region, the EU was merely doing it for the sake of peace and security with the region and the entire Europe. Yet, if we look at such EU efforts by the means it tries to reach, we can deduce that the EU is purely civilian despite coercions. This is from Maull’s (2005) definition, where a civilian actor can be civilian despite coercion, if it is used to safeguard international interactions.

2. EU Foreign Policy in Practice

End of the Cold war marked a substantial change in international issues. Yugoslavian crises, transition of Eastern Europe into the Western style of capitalism, and the threat of Terrorism to the West required EU’s response. Thus, many came to question whether the EU is a powerful force in the shaping of the international system, and to what extent is the Union capable of functioning as an effective actor across its external activities.

In answering such questions, many analysts sought to explore how to recognise an actor in International sphere (see Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Sjursen 2004). Realist view, looks at the case from hard power perspective, and questioned the Unions’ military capability. Intergovernmentalist scholars explicitly wanted to support the EU’s civilian power and perceived it as an asset in the post-Cold War world order (See Moravcsik 2010). However, these claims don’t capture the complexity of the EU, but limit it into its behaviour only (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Thus, in order to explore the EU’s capability, we need to redefine actor in the international sphere.

Yet, these analyses effectively demonstrate how the EU civilian power gave rise to the collapse of several blocs. According to Smith (2000: 11), the EU has been making use of positive and negative conditions to reach certain ends. The believe is that absolutist manner in using soft has caused the collapse of several hard power nations like in the Balkans; Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Such critiques are based on the EU’s lack of control on the
failed states, stemming from its hard power shortages. The failure in the EU began with ESDP being unable to control the failed states. The end of the Cold war was the cause of the break up and collapse of the European security architecture. The concepts that had held the together the international order or disorder were revealed with the East, West, communist and free world being replaced by American hard power, an increasingly defined European power and that of the Moslem world. The Cold war saw the Soviet Union present threats to the security of the region and the World. The need for the definition of the threats and security issues to the EU and the World was not done. Such threats led to the dangerous acts of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed rogue states that threatened the peace in Europe and the international scene.

Therefore, many would agree that rogue states have been the main threat to the security of the EU since they are seen to give sanctuary and support to military actions like terrorism. The expectation is that these failed states make it possible for terrorists and malicious groups to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. The need is for the EU to realise that they will need for aggressive military activities to reduce the threat posed by these rogue states (Shepherd 2003). However, as shall be discussed, the EU has failed in many occasions to secure regions, manage the rogue states in their own backyard, and make decisions on actions to be taken on these states. This is in contrast to the US actions where they rapidly respond and act on any rogue state that is suspected of terrorist and threatening the security of the region and the world.

The use of the EU soft power in foreign policy has brought about problems to the region and the world in general. The focus of humanitarian efforts and violation of human rights, by the EU, has created a discourse where, such violations are associated with the EU’s weakness as an international actor (Kagan 2004). Through this measure, the EU removes conflicts of complex political, economic, and social dynamics that interact at the local, international and regional levels. It is this discourse that has disassociated the causes of the conflicts in the world and Third World nations from Western influence and international market. At the same time, the practice of humanitarian intervention efforts like seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo did not prevent conflict. The view held by Bono (2006: 31) is that this discourse has led Western interest in the affairs of less developed countries and the eventual taking
sides by the EU in disputes. Such taking of sides was associated with the protectorates and the Kosovo model.

These Western interests in foreign policy issues within troubled regions stems from the interconnection and diversity in EU’s and US’s foreign policy measures. The view of this paper and that of other authors like Sweeney (2007: 5) believe that the EU’s soft power and the US hard power are the reason why countries like Kosovo and Bosnia has failed. The reason being the interplay of thoughts and views arise from the type of power dictating their foreign policy. The EU’s foreign policy covers aspects like building of democracy, sustenance of human rights laws and the protection of the environment. It has been the ability of the EU to enlarge and have relative economic and political stability that has seen it on the international map. The other fact is that the Petersberg Tasks, of peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts have made the EU to have military objectives.

Consequently, looking at the entire structure of the EU, there is one inherent weakness, which is the lack of clear understanding of the strategic role, relationships with NATO (Howorth 2010). Through these weaknesses, it is clear that the failure for the EU to construct a meaningful ESDP, and lack of credible foreign policy is the major weaknesses of its foreign policy. Such weaknesses have been associated with the collapse of several nations and regions within the EU. At the same time, this collapse of nations and regional peace has created many analysts to come to the conclusion that the EU needed an army.

Sweeney (2007: 24) contends that this lack of strategic role has also undermined the relationship between the US and EU foreign policy, and the future of NATO. The expectation is that for the ESDP to fulfil its role, it must have developed hard power assets to boost the effectiveness of the EU’s soft power (Hyde-Price 2004; Shepherd 2003). The expectation of such analysts is that, in order to be a credible actor; it must cope with high political challenges. The issues that face the Union currently are failed states like Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, international crime, weapon proliferation, terrorism and disease. The expectation is that the EU as the power within Europe should be able to exercise its leadership abilities in solving these problems. The other expectation is that if the EU is to succeed in influencing the US and other states in dealing with global problems, it must have political cohesion (Peterson 2008).
Another reason why the EU needs a coherent ESDP and army after the Cold War is due to the differences in strategies with the US. Over the decades, the similarities that existed between the US and EU have faded. Currently the Europeans have been able to develop different security interests from the US. The EU is considered pretentious in the projection of power as compared to the US’s hard power. The US has developed itself to a military power even in foreign policy, with many military bases being set up in the Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Through such facilities the US is able to project its power world wide, with a global empire that the EU does not have nor strive to attain.

The interests of the EU are internal and regional as they concentrate on Europe and their former colonies with latent responsibility. As compared to the US, the EU has no desire to be a world police nor is it driven by any moral certitude like that of the God-like US (Zielonka 2008). It is this strategic environment that has presented problems for the EU and especially NATO. The hard power that the US employs drives it to value NATO. We find that the US attacks on other nations like that on Afghanistan is preceded by the concept of lead others to follow. The US is ready to take up military attacks with or without the help of others to respond to threats. The same concept of a US hard power military attack was led on Iraq. The dependence of the US military power in Europe has led to several failures and collapse of regions.

According to Toje (2005: 124), it was the US led intervention in the Iraq crisis that caused a need of repair in the European security relations. It was the diplomatic forays before the Iraq war that showed that the ESDP was not properly matched in forging common views in governance and security. This was a war that showed that the EU’s soft foreign policy on security was weak and in need for re-strategy. It was the Iraq war that led the EU leaders to sit and draw up strategies to help the Union have a greater responsibility in Security matters and reconstruction efforts in the world.

The EU over the years has slowly taken an interest in the world scene. It is this interest that has been driven by the failures of regions within its borders over the decades. On security and military action, the EU was heavily dependent on the US lead actions on security and threats. Such an interest in security and threats has driven many academics to criticise the EU’s soft foreign policy that led them not to get involved in NATO’s action in Bosnia (Kagan 2004). The US, has been an effective toolbox for the EU to make use of. Of interest is the fact that
the EU is more diplomatic, has less military capability, and is an economic power compared to the US (Toje 2005: 132). It is the EU’s soft or civilian power approach to foreign policy and security that has caused them to have a significant effect on international affairs and more so to the crisis within it. Their lack of proper management of their hard line nations and regions like the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan regions has been caused by poor management and definition of the ESDP and CFSP (Toje 2005: 127). In addition, the EU has been unable to coordinate and manage the resources of its members and turn these resources to actual influence. It is the lack of focus in common strategy and military operations that the EU efforts in crisis cannot be noticed or felt.

The response of experts has been that the EU needs to make its foreign policy effective. The EU members also need to channel the necessary components of their own foreign and security policies at the Union. In order for such a strategy to occur, there is need for them to set up common goals and accept on how they can achieve them (Toje 2005). It is remarkable that the need for change in the EU’s security strategy was not due mainly to the US’s attack on Iraq, in 2003. The attack had a profound effect on Europe due to the fact that it put the US at great odds with some EU countries. The attack also revealed the EU common policy to be lacking more so in these common EU states, a fact that had for a long time tried to be covered in ambiguousness. Now faced with the worst crisis in the EU history, the member states were unable to reach an agreement on ways they could handle the Iraq crisis and attempts of the US to influence policies (Peterson 2008).

During that period, the EU fell under the conflicts on the Iraq war of the Member States (Toje 2005). It was the idea that the US was depicting them as the real power within Europe, not the EU that also sparked interest in a change in foreign security policy. The negative remarks on EU’s failure were openly made academics and leaders, with Secretary Rumsfeld branding Germany and France as ‘Old Europe’ (Moustakis and Violakis 2008). This showed that indeed, the problems within the European common security and defence policy were due to the rift that existed in the transatlantic relation.

Following such remarks, few European members supported to the US led mission, with the motivation of strengthening the international security. It is the participation of these countries in the Iraq war that led to the paralysis of the ESDP (Toje 2005: 123). Therefore, we find that the EU Security Strategy (ESS) did not arise from internal needs but from
outside influences led by the US actions. The ESS was therefore created with the hope that it could provide the member states with a platform where meaningful policies for the future could be formed, as well as with the hope to meet the transatlantic relations and the relations within the EU (Bretherton and Vogler 2006).

The problem cited by many academics and analysts is that there is lack of strategic culture in the EU policy. According to Vennesson et al. (2009: 638), the endorsement of military actions in role conception and organisation are important in reaching a common ground in the EU national level. With the military force and power being very distinct from the EU, there will be crisis within its regions and more so in the rogue member states. The hope by Fotios and Petros (2008: 427) is that EU member states must develop an ESDP strategy to face the challenges they have been facing in the restructuring process of their states. The concept is that the EU must lay down effective strategic cultures that can be embedded in the EU, its member’s states and even NATO (Howorth 2010). This strategic culture is meant to give the EU a framework through which any actor can approach the issue of security and threats from force. In the process it will be the handling of the hard power capabilities on their own policy resources rather than reliance on the US power. The need also arises from the lack of coupling between the military and policy objectives.

According to Fotios and Petros (2008: 429), the EU has failed in the cultural aspect of the strategies. This is due to the fact that the member states have continually failed to agree on where, when and what reasons the EU military forces must respond. This implies that in the end, there are limitations within the EU military capabilities with lack of agreement upon ends to be applied to reach their means. Further divisions and diversity on EU foreign policy on security is realised with the division of two thoughts. The first is from small states like Austria and Ireland that would want to see the functions of the ESDP limited to the region, while bigger nations like France and Britain want functions extended to the global level. Yet, a majority of the member states are torn between, with Germany wanting to see the EU and the ESDP taking on as lesser tools for power, that of civilian.

However, on another scale, analysts like Stavridis (2001) believe that the EU can have both military capabilities and still remain as a civilian actor. The opposing view is that the EU has been taken to be very heterogeneous that it cannot have a strategic culture that is meaningful. The idea is that this heterogeneous view can prevent them from reaching nay meaningful
political integration. Another view is held by Rynning Sten (2003), who believes that the EU has no the capability to be a liberal power but needs to be driven by greater powers.

On the contrary, despite these views, the ESS have not made mention on any of these alliances in military support but rather aims at the EU’s engagement. The view of these opinions is that the main barrier to the development of the strategic culture is the mode of collective decision making strategy in the EU that does not give way to rapid intervention efforts. This implies that before the EU is able to effectively react to any crisis within its borders, member states and leaders must come to agreement on the most appropriate steps. In the process, the EU has failed in many occasions to rise up to security threats within the regions. The indication that there is a wide spread difficulty in policy formulation is the fact that in recent years, decision-making capabilities have been left to the devices of Germany, Britain and France. The policy coordination between the three states attests to the fact that the 27 member states cannot come to a consensus on measures to take on their own foreign security policy (Peterson 2008). An example of this difficulty was the Iraq war, where the 25 voting nations were unable to reach to a decisive decision on what security steps were to be taken.

Ideally the three nations have been seen in the preparation of grounds for policy formulation and the creation of a nucleus for this purpose. Therefore, in light of the events within EU foreign policy formulation, the creation of an EU security council would be an effective measure to respond to the growing crisis within decision making ability of the Union. This would present a better measure, and more coordinated sphere for the member states. The problem then is reduced to if the interests of the three member states attest to the desires of all members.

According to Mona (2005: 13), the lack of consensus has led to disagreements over issues that face the EU like the Kyoto protocol, International Criminal Court, arms embargo on China and the Iraq war. The paper finds that there are polemics on the hard against soft security solutions and power against the burden sharing strategy of the US option to EU’s multilateral cooperation approach. To Mona (2005), other diversities within the EU region is the polarity in enlargement processes of the EU and NATO. This is because they both affect each other on matters like security, globalisation and trade liberalisation. It was the new economic and political architecture within Europe that led to the different dimensions of
economy and security between the transatlantic relations. The proposal by Mona (2005) is that he EU is expected to step up and reach a unilateralism with the US through military burden sharing.

Crocci (2002) argues that the split between the US and EU ideology caused the rise of rogue states and security threats in Europe, and in the globe. According to the view of this writer, the Europeans often see themselves as equal partners who dislike the US’s unilateralism. On the other hand, the US views itself as the chosen nation with the responsibility of defending Western interests, values and ideals (Huntington 1998). The problems that have emerged due to the differences in roles of the two partners have been made worse by the cultural and attitude differences that have existed for many years. The Americans find it hard to deal with the criticism of the Europeans who hold themselves in such moral grounds, which make them engage only in diplomatic efforts, rather than military means like the Americans (Everts 2001; Kagan 2004).

The failed attempts of the CFSP and foreign policy in Europe are due to the EU’s failure at laying its role in the Balkans crisis. This weakness caused the call for EU defence projects and the eventual creation of one by the member states. In the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, many EU members were inclined towards the creation of a cordon sanitaire within Macedonia and Albania (Giegerich and Wallace 2010). The reason for this was to stop the flow of weapons, supplies and personnel to the region and in the process give Serbia an incentive to lose its grip on Kosovo. Since the EU lacked military capability and cohesion within the political realm, they were forced to accept the military support of the US that issued a military threat to Milosevic. According to Croci (2002: 21), the European responded with a military force that was directed by the US.

Such has been the efforts of the EU to have security control over their region but have failed terribly. With the lack of consensus between the member states, it becomes increasingly difficult to enforce the EU foreign security and defence policy. In the end, the region has been plagued by the worst cases of security threats and the rise of hard core rogue states since the Cold war. The different soft approaches to security foreign policy to the American hard power has made it impossible for the EU to enforce any security policy, let alone give power to their treaties to take effect. It is after the crisis, within the Balkans and the recent terrorism
threat and Iraq invasion that raised the question of the importance of establishing a fully practicing European army.

3. EU as a Civilian Actor

Having analyzed the situational analysis in the EU, it is evident that it has the best example of a civilian power within the international community. From the readings, it is evident that the EU’s ability to uphold itself and its behaviour through well defined aims, stable values, principles that influence the international relations they have. A nation or body that depicts civil principles is able to accept the power of cooperation between themselves and others. It is this ability to cooperate with other nations towards meeting international goals that make the EU a real civilian power. Over the years, the EU has been able to promote the same civil characteristic with success. This is because the Union has been able in several cases to apply their civilian influences over economic, diplomatic and political aspects. It has helped many nations realise political democracy, social, reconstruction and economic and trade relations.

As was realised in the previous chapter, the EU has the ability to use its diplomatic instruments to reach their aims. The EU has been known to be very generous through aid donations as they assist member states and the international community realise independence in economics, politics and social aspects (Moravcsik 2010). Apart from their own member states, we find the same generosity and cooperation with countries within Latin America and Africa where they have greatly assisted in aid relief, donations and grants, from reconstruction efforts and democracy building in countries like Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo (European Union External Action 2011). It is through the use of aid donations, persuasion, dialogue, and economic and cultural link that they have been able to influence these developing countries.

In addition, the civilian nature of the EU is seen from its ability as a multilateral organisation to represent its people and member states to the international community as democratic region. The EU performs duties on behalf of its member states. Such duties entail the monitoring and giving of information about those states that they assist with instruments on behalf of its members (European Union External Action 2011). The EU is able to afford the member states a chance to receive information and feedback from recipients of their aid donations, grants, policing and reconstruction efforts.
In order to fully realise that the EU is indeed a fully fledged civilian power, we can make comparisons with a country like the US and its foreign policy. The EU is a civilian power due to the lack of military force they use to reach their ends like the US does. Looking at the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US made use of force and went into these countries with their own objectives. From the days of Ronald Reagan, Bush Senior, Bill Clinton, and Bush Junior; the US has engaged in military force in one country or another. Yet, the irony is that despite the promise not to go to war from the lessons they learnt from Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans under Barack Obama used military force on Libya with many reasons. According to Kagan (2010), the talk of diplomacy by the current US government has been mere rhetoric since they have gone back to the use of military force to meet their needs.

Looking at the strategy of the EU and the US in both wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that the US is an extreme hard power actor, whereas the EU is a soft power actor. First and foremost, we find that the US under George Bush junior went into Iraq with many objectives. These entailed the finding and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and the building of democratic nations. Though there was a desire to have democracy in Iraq, analysts like Kagan (2010: 34) and O’Sullivan (2011: 1) believe that the US still lacked a clear definition on how this democracy was of any interest to them. Moreover, this democracy was to be realised through the use of military force to drive out Saddam Hussein, his allies and the extreme Muslims like the Taliban. The lack of clearly defined goals towards this end led to many serious problems from the start. The fast military action taken following the 9/11 attacks made the US complicate, and have a multifaceted occupation project that used many resources and required a huge part of the national budget. The EU on the other hand, took their time with the Iraq and Afghan case due to the varied opinions and the lack of consensus from the member voters.

The EU did not attack Iraq or Afghanistan as a bloc, but rather nations like Britain single headedly joined the US. Therefore, despite the support for the Iraq and Afghan wars by nations like Britain and France, we cannot say that the EU made us of military force in these wars. The sole leader on the military attack on Iraq and Afghanistan was the US. Meanwhile, the EU made efforts after the Iraq war in 2003, to send their first emergency support to Iraq. According to a report by the European Commission, the EU sent this support after 20 years of sanctions imposed on Iraq (EuropeAid Development and Cooperation 2011). Therefore, for
the period preceding 2003, we find that the EU made use of dialogue, economic and trade sanctions as means to force Iraq to meet human rights and other civil rights, meanwhile the US on two separate attacks had used military force to make Iraq be persuaded. The use of military force on Iraq by the US had been seen on two separate occasions; the first was in the early 90s when George senior attacked Iraq for invading Kuwait and later in 2001-2002 after George Junior invaded Iraq to rid it of Saddam.

We find that the two countries had varying views of the use of foreign policy and power in both cases. For this reason, we can see that the US made use of the excuse of ‘the best case scenario’, and underestimated the challenges of war. However, the war on Iraq and Afghanistan has taken a decade to this date, has cost Americans billions of dollars that can be used on health and even security and has turned out to be very complicated. Apart from the billions of money lost in the wars, the US success in Iraq and Afghanistan has come at a cost with many thousands of lost American lives. The main problem that the hard power tactic used by the US has created was that they had failed to factor in the cost of the post Iraq and Afghan wars (Fraser 2007). Following the use of force and military threat, the Iraqis and Afghani were forced to also take up arms to defend their own nation. It is the act of defending their nation, culture and resources from US invasion that is not patriotic to the Americans but rather insurgence.

The EU acts differently from the US, as the US boasts of their military superiority and makes use of it to advance their own interests. The EU makes use of dialogue, sanctions, and reconstruction and persuasion instruments to influence the cause of the outcome within these nations (Rogerson 2004). One of the major interests promoted by the US military is security and the threat to the international security. This threat is felt more if it is guided towards American interests. The removal of Saddam and the Taliban has created a vacuum that the US was unable to fill in; it is this vacuum that has caused all the social, economic and political unrest in the two countries. As the US still makes use of the military forces to safeguard their interests like the oil reserves, and the destruction of poppy fields, the EU has embarked on a massive reconstruction and recovery effort. This diplomatic move can be seen as a means to cool down the tempers within the Arab community towards the attacks on their people and their culture.
The EU efforts are also used to make the region change from their old hard Islamic fundamentalism towards a more modern democratic set up. The EU made huge donations during their 2003 humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Iraq at € 100 million (EuropeAid Development and Cooperation 2011). Later in 2004, the EU set up an International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) that was to coordinate all reconstruction efforts within Iraq (IRFI 2011). This was a multi donor trust fund that was run by the EU plus the United Nations and World Bank. Through the IRFFI, 25 donors were able to contribute to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq with 180 projects being completed by 2008. This commission has been working in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq to this day with billions of dollars being pumped into this project.

According to European Commission Report (2008), there was another reconstruction program in 2007 that was created to give funds in support for Law and Justice. These funds initially amounted to € 14 million, and was created to help the ongoing efforts in integration rule law mission for Iraq (EU JUSTLEX) supported by the EU. The same funds were also used to mobilise support for the electoral process at € 20 million through the IRFFI and the public finance management reform (Fletchtnr 2006: 27). The European commission also was able to give support for the provision of basic education and health services to Iraqi refugees who were in Jordan and Syria (European Commision 2008). This support and donation was also given to the internally displaced Iraqis though the IRFFI and any humanitarian operations. Later in 2008, the EU made use of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) through bilateral agreements that was geared towards the improvement of capacity for leadership and dialogue of the government and administration of Iraq (EuropeAid Development and Cooperation 2008). The aim of this package was to assist the Iraq reconstruction efforts through their own institutions and the improvement of the life of the Iraqi. Assistance has also been given to special programs like the technical assistance to council representatives to assist Iraqis to build their institutions. They also assisted in the development of medical services through the World Health Organisation. This is to assist the Iraq ministry of health provide Iraqis with medical services, emergency medical services, blood bank services, pre-hospital care and in-hospital care and mental health support.

Support for other Iraqi institutions was seen through the funds given to the rebuilding of the water and sanitation services. The EU together with the assistance of UNICEF decided to
help the Iraqi improve their water and sanitation systems. The EU also gave support for thematic programs through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR) (European Union Fact Sheet 2010). This was geared towards focusing on the human rights violations.

This assistance given to the Iraqi by the EU, immediately after the invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam has made the EU look more civilian than their counterparts the US. The US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan made several assumptions that cost them the war. The US thought that they would simply out Saddam and the Taliban and put in a new power. The US had made plans to take over Afghanistan after ousting the Taliban and the handing over immediately to the Iraqis after the invasion. The US was however, sidelined as it forgot its agenda and took over control of the two nations. The other foresight made by Bush was that after the ousting of the leaders, the new political process would bring about security. The increase of the US troops in 2007 was mainly due to the fact that Bush believed that the Iraqi local authorities needed protection as they made very tough decisions (Duffy 2008).

Therefore, if the US and the World in general understood the needs of Iraq and Afghan, they would allow them to improve their own securities. Rather than take up all functions of government and administration, the EU only assists to reconstruct institutions and resources. The US on the other hand, took up all government and administration responsibilities rather than leave them to the Iraqis as they had planned to. The difficulty created by the US hard power strategy was that it was very difficult to develop and maintain a coalition after a war or invasion. This lack of coalition implies that there is continued need for the leadership of America rather than control by the local government. This is the strategy which the US also intends to use on Libya. The European governments on the other hand consider these nations very important to their interests. This is especially so for the case of Libya where the EU is giving more political backing than they did for Afghanistan. Though, the US has opted to make use of military power on Libya, the EU has made use of their traditional dialogue and diplomacy instruments.

The other major problem created by the use of military force on Iraq and Afghanistan was that the removal of the controlling powers, that is Saddam and Taliban created room for other leaders. Such is the case that led to the rise of Tehran as the regional leader after the Taliban and Saddam fell. The problem arose due to the fact that the US failed to plan for a broader
regional strategy but concentrated on the Iraq and Afghanistan specifically. Therefore, the end the war on Iraq and Afghanistan led to the rise of a new threat; Iran. In the end, the decisions made by the US were not thoroughly considered as they rushed into a war that they were clearly not prepared for. This also shows that the hard power foreign policy employed failed them and the world miserably. On the other hand, it can be argued that the EU’s slow strategy before considering what to do with Iraq was a form of soft power. The EU’s strategy with Iraq was the creation of a more secure, prosperous, unified and stable democratic nation that was to give positive contributions to the region. The EU foreign policy for Iraq has been the securing of social, political and economic reconstruction efforts within the framework of the UN Security Council resolution.

According to the European Union Fact Sheet (2010), the EU foreign policy has concentrated on the provision of military and policing efforts to Iraq to improve security within and without the nation. Secondly, the EU gives coordination and outreach programs through other actors like the World Bank through the IRFFI to contribute to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq (Hyde-Price 2004:341). The Union also makes use of the funds collected in order to use these donations to realise a democratic and fair process in Iraq. The EU has also tried to make ties with Iraq through the development of relations. Yet, the member states are achieving this through the provision of fund packages for persuading the local government to get involved in the reconstruction effort. However, the EU has also supported Iraq in WTO as means to improve the nations’ trade and cooperation (EuropeAid Development and Cooperation 2011). The EU has also supported electoral processes within Iraq as measures to realise democracy. Mainly we find that the EU has supported Iraq in all areas of its political, economic and social aspects through bodies like the UN, IRFFI and CDI that are politically neutral.

The main problem that had been realised in chapter two was that the soft foreign policy the EU holds has also contributed to the rise of hard states like Iraq and Afghanistan that oppress and violate their own people. It is realised that in order to bring harmony within the international foreign policy and security, there is need for the two major players to work hand in hand (Wallace 2001). This would not be the first time the EU and US have worked together towards the realisation of better international relations and security. They two have had a long standing relationship as the greatest powers in the international scene. One aspect that is common to these powers is the belief in democracy, market economies and human
rights. The US has always supported the EU in its integration process; without support from the US, the EU would have been difficult to set up. This relationship is very useful to them at all levels from business, social and cultural aspects, post-war reconstruction, war on terror, crisis management, and trade. The partnership between the EU and US would go a long way in the reconstruction efforts within war torn countries. The two also have the power to control international foreign policy on security due to their massive support. Their support for each other goes a long way, before the Cold war.

The EU and US have always worked together in many occasions. Under the New Transatlantic Agenda, in 1995 and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership in 1998 have also contributed to the relationship (Holsti 1995). There was also EU-US summit in 2002 that set out to create the Positive Economic Agenda. The US and EU would benefit from their coalition in foreign policy because, the EU provides persuasion and diplomatic means and post-war reconstruction to reach an end. The US uses military power to reach a means. If both worked together, the US would only have to unleash the army when negotiations and discussions have failed. Such joint measures will delay any need for force after the foreign policy has exhaustingly made use of all persuasive options. The relationship between the US and EU can go a long way in the reduction of the problems experienced due to the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan.

The failures realised due to a weak soft foreign policy by the EU led to the deteriorating of peace and the rise of human right violations within Iraq and Afghanistan. It is very possible for the soft power of the EU to tone down the hard power of the US and avoid the problems identified due to the use of military power as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the hard power of the US can improve the strength of the soft EU power in order to deal with security and rogue states within their regions. The EU does need the military tactic that the US employs in order to ensure that the international relations are protected from economic, social and political threats. Yet, the EU’s soft power can help improve the image of the US, and the West, in the World and more so in the countries it has already invaded.

Conclusion

From the research, it is evident that the EU is a civilian actor that enjoys the foreign policy based on civilian powers. The EU is a civilian power because it has been able to use power
and behaviour through well defined aims, stable values, principles that influence the international relations they have. The EU is also able to cooperate with other nations towards meeting international goals that make it a real civilian power. Through instruments like aid relief, donations and grants, from reconstruction efforts, policing and democracy efforts, the EU is able to direct their interests in the recipient nations. The EU also represents its member states; give information and monitoring those states that they assist with instruments. It was been argued that the EU is a soft power through the comparison with the US foreign policy that is hard power (Holsti 1995).

However, as seen in the paper, the problem with soft powers in foreign policy is the emergence of rogue and difficult states that follow their own ideals. The other problem with the EU foreign policy is its EDSP where there is lack of strategy culture. The soft power has created a crisis due to the poor strategic plans and member states who continually fail to agree on what is to be done. The numerous decision making arms make it difficult to arrive at a decision. The EU foreign policy has led to divisions and diversity on EU foreign policy on security is realised with the division of two thoughts. Since ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ powers are extremes that have their own negative effects on foreign policy. It has been suggested in the last chapter that the European Union joins with the ‘hard’ power tactics of the Americans as training manoeuvres. The idea is that the EU and the US can combine their powers in order to find the best foreign policy to secure security within their boarders and maintenance of international relations.
Acknowledgements

While significantly different in many respects, this paper is revised version of the Undergraduate thesis I completed in 2011. Therefore, my acknowledgements must go to my Undergraduate supervisor in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, Dr. Neil Winn for his valuable suggestions. Away from the University, I can never thank enough the ‘Gordon Place Residents’ for their unending support for myself. Finally, the paper is dedicated to Arzu Feta who became the ‘Light of my life’. Words can never describe how important she is to me.

References:


