An analysis of civilian, military and normative power in EU foreign policy.
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Abstract

This dissertation will evaluate the EU’s civilian power, military power and normative power in terms of its foreign policy. It will analyse what academic work exists regarding these types of power. It will identify and critique challenges to the credibility of each type of power. It will also look at Operation Artemis and Operation Atalanta as case studies in order to further demonstrate how the EU exercises these types of power. This dissertation will acknowledge the substantial developments in the EU’s military power since the advent of the European Security and Defence Policy and its considerable references to normative values in treaties and political discourse. However, the EU’s civilian power, in which it seeks cooperation, values multilateralism, and exists as a global economic power, remains the most appropriate label for the EU as a global actor.
Introduction

The debate about whether the EU can be considered a civilian power, a military power, or a normative power has attracted considerable attention from European political science scholars. Due to the nature of the EU as an ever-changing political entity, the debate over which type of power the EU exercises will continue. Undoubtedly in the near future, research on this topic will provide fresh and valuable contributions to this debate. The objective of this dissertation is to analyse all three of these types of power and critique each power thesis. My main research question therefore will be,

“Studying its behaviour and conduct in its foreign policy, how can we best describe the EU today- as a civilian, military, or a normative power?”

To answer this main question, this dissertation will answer secondary questions: Who has contributed to the debate on these types of power? What are the challenges that each of these types of power face? What empirical evidence can we find to support the assertions of each type of power?

In order to answer these questions and the primary research question, this dissertation will use primary and secondary sources. In terms of primary sources, material from various European institutions, parliamentary reports and United Nations reports will be used. In terms of secondary sources, books, think tank reports and journal and newspaper articles will be used. Firstly, this dissertation will provide a brief summary of institutional and treaty developments in the EU’s common foreign and defence policy since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in December 1991. Many of these developments will be referred to in the analysis of each type of power. Then, the dissertation will analyse the debate regarding civilian, military, and finally normative power. This will cover the academic literature that is appropriate to each type of power and the features that make up each type of power. Then the challenges to each type of power will be identified and evaluated. Then this dissertation will look at two case studies, Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 and the current Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. These will be representative case studies (Hague and Harrop, 2010, p. 44) as each case study can contribute to the broader understanding and debate of the EU existing as a civilian power, a military power or a normative power. Looking at each of these two case studies, this dissertation will identify how the EU has acted
in accordance with these three types of power. Then each case study will finish with a brief conclusion summarising how each operation can provide evidence that helps answer the main research question of this dissertation.

This dissertation will conclude that the EU can be best described as a civilian power. The EU’s emphasis on negotiation, multilateralism and economic instruments of foreign policy ensures that it acts as a civilian power in the world today. The increasing militarization of the EU over the past decade has been significant. One of the EU’s objectives is to possess greater military capabilities so that it can act rapidly to respond to international threats. It has shown in Operation Artemis and Operation Atalanta that it can deploy troops and a quick speed and can act effectively and meet the objectives of the mission. However, the EU’s military power is still at an embryonic stage. Normative power Europe has recently been an attractive thesis for various scholars and academics. In political discourse, normative power has been used to justify EU actions. The EU has certain normative values that it is keen to spread around the world. For example, a key part of the EU’s external policy is the promotion of human rights. Various academics argue that the militarization of the EU is actually jeopardising the EU’s civilian and normative power. However, this dissertation will argue that military power is completely compatible with the notions of civilian and normative power. The demonstration of military power is occasionally essential in order to achieve civilian and normative objectives, as Operation Artemis and Operation Atalanta has shown. The EU undoubtedly demonstrates all the three types of power under discussion in this dissertation. However, the most fundamental features of the EU’s foreign policy are multilateralism and negotiation. The EU also prides itself on its colossal economic power and its commitment to be a leading aid donor to third countries. The EU is certainly emerging as a credible military actor and its eagerness to promote norms throughout the world is greatly documented. However, its civilian power usurps both of these types of power.

**A Summary of CFSP and ESDP Developments**

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was developed as the second intergovernmental pillar of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), signed on December 1991 (King, 2005, p. 44). This pillar was based on an intergovernmental approach to decision-making. In the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, the Petersburg Tasks, which were first formulated by the Western European Union in 1992, were incorporated within its domain. These tasks
included humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management (Wallace, 2005, p. 443). These could be employed by the EU on missions outside the Union. In 1998, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and French President, Jacques Chirac, expressed their wish for the EU to act autonomously in international crises. As a result, the ESDP was formally adopted at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. Additionally, Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative of the CFSP in order to help ensure successful progress of the CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In December of that year, the Helsinki European Council adopted the Helsinki Headline Goals, pledging member state governments to constitute a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troop and deployable within 60 days by 2003 (Keane, 2005, p. 91). As a response to the international tension after the World Trade Centre attacks in New York on September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001, a European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, was agreed at the Brussels European Council in December 2003. This set out the strategic thinking of the EU in a tumultuous international arena. In June 2004, the European Council announced the ‘Headline Goal 2010’, which built on the original Helsinki Goals, which aimed to develop further the process of strengthening military capabilities. The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This aimed to improve coordination of member state action in foreign and security policy. The first and current incumbent of this post is Baroness Catherine Ashton. The Lisbon Treaty also renamed the ESDP to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Civilian Power Europe

François Duchène was one of the most prominent scholars of civilian power Europe (CPE) in the 1970s. According to Duchène (1973, p. 19), the EEC existed, and should continue to remain, as “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces”. It is important to put Duchène’s idea in its context. In the early 1970s, the general conclusion regarding power mechanisms was that the significance of military power was diminishing at the same pace as that of economics was growing. The impact of the oil crises of the 1970s indicated that military power no longer carried the same relevance to international politics as before (Stavridis, 2001a, p. 44). Additionally, Kenneth Twitchett further argued that the European Community’s impact on the international system had been via trade and diplomatic influence rather than via military power (Twitchett, 1976), cited in McCormick (2007, p. 70).
Therefore, non-military means of engagement were essential in CPE discussion. Hans Maull later provided a further definition of a ‘civilian power’. It implies

“the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management” (Maull, 1990, pp. 92-3).

This definition is one that has been used considerably in academic literature and will form the basis of my analysis of CPE.

Christopher Hill is a key advocate of the notion of ‘civilian power’ Europe. Around a similar time to Hedley Bull, a sceptic of CPE, Hill (1983, p. 200) argued that Western European global behaviour emphasised “diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of economic solutions to political problems, and the need for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate”. Therefore diplomacy is also a central tenet to CPE. Hill (1993, pp. 310-11) also argued that EC functions in the post-Cold War world included stabilising Western Europe, managing world trade, providing the principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South, and providing a second western voice in international diplomacy. These tasks all appear very ‘civilian’ in nature and emphasise diplomacy and economics in the EU’s approach to international relations.

Therefore, a core feature of CPE is the reluctance to use military force. As Moravcsik (2002) argues, the EU’s civilian power “does not lie in the deployment of battalions or bombers, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping”. Therefore, much discussion on CPE has centred on the significance of economic power rather than on military power. For example, the giving of aid, trade relations and formalised economic relations are key components of this economic power (Manners and Whitman, 2003, p. 388). The EU is on a par with the US in terms of import and export figures, and if intra-EU trade is included, Europe’s trade in goods amounts to 40 per cent of world trade (Orbie, 2008, p. 36). Additionally, since the creation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, the EU has become more conscious of its power in the international
system and has strived to increase his influence over the WTO (Van Den Hoven, 2004, p. 256). According to Smith and Woolcock,

“perhaps the most powerful instrument available to the EC for the implementation of commercial policy is market access, or the granting, conditioning or denial of access to the European Single Market, one of the most prosperous markets in the world” (ibid, p. 36, quoting Smith and Woolcock, 1999, p. 451).

The EU certainly then has the power to play a great role in the world’s trade relations. Its growing economic presence has ensured that the EU can be seen as exercising a form of trade duopoly with the US, and gradually, the EU has developed an equivalent capacity to act (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 88).

Additionally, the EU plays an immense role in the world in terms of aid to third countries. The EU is one of the largest donors in the world, distributing aid to approximately 145 recipient countries, more than any other donor (Smith, 2008, p. 61). The decision by major global players to entrust the European Commission with the task of coordinating the West’s programme to assist the economic reform process in Poland and Hungary in the immediate post-Cold War era (Smith, 2004, p. 66) is a clear demonstration of the acknowledgement others gave to the EU due to its expertise and influence in providing global aid. A contemporary demonstration of the EU as a significant donor is in Afghanistan. The EU and its member states provide more than one third of all financial assistance and aid programs to Afghanistan. The EU Commission also plays a commendable role in funding educational and social programmes in Afghanistan (Klaiber, 2007, p. 10). When providing aid, the EU has the ability to impose economic and financial sanctions on third countries. It can reduce, suspend or redirect aid, thereby giving itself an influential economic instrument of power (Smith, 2008, p. 62). Therefore, economic instruments of foreign policy are central to the CPE thesis.

Whitman (2006a, p. 9) argues that the European Security Strategy of 2003 is compatible with the notion of CPE. One of the key guiding principles within the strategy is the undertaking of a multilateral approach to address international issues. The ESS states,
“In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective” (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 9).

Multilateralism is a key tenet of CPE. The EU has demonstrated this by playing a pivotal role in the development, adoption and implementation of important new multilateral legal instruments, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and initiatives like the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention Verification Protocol and the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 302). In addition, one can see clearly this emphasis on multilateralism in relations with Iran. In order to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear development programme, the EU (albeit with action mainly taken by the ‘EU3’ – France, Germany and the United Kingdom), along with actors such as the US and China, pursued policies based on a preference for engagement and dialogue (Dryburgh, 2008, p. 267). Iran demonstrated its acknowledgment of the role that the EU played by participating in these comprehensive dialogues (ibid, p. 266). Therefore, the emphasis on multilateralism is also a very important part of CPE.

**Challenges to CPE**

However, the civilian instrument of trade power may be under threat. According to Grimm (2010, p. 45), parallel with the rise of some developing countries, not least East and Southeast Asia, the EU has, since the 1980s, gradually been losing share of world trade. Additionally, growing trade powers such as China and India are likely to attract a greater volume of trade over the coming decade, thereby challenging the influence of the EU in this area. With the growing economies of China and India, increasing market access to fast growing economies is essential for the EU to maintain its trade dominance (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 200). According to Van Langenhove (2010, p. 6), the economic gravity shift from West to East may have a major impact on the ability of the EU to portray itself as a major global actor within the next couple of decades. As former European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, once declared, Europe has to accept “fierce competition” from China (European Commission: Trade, 2006). However, this currently does not substantially diminish the huge impact of the EU’s impact on global trade. As McCormick (2007, p. 84) argues, there can be very few remaining doubts about the EU’s economic power in the world today. It is still an
economic colossus and trading giant. Therefore, CPE in an economic sense is still very much relevant in policy and academic circles today.

More recently, there have been various academics who have argued that the increasing militarization of the EU means that ‘civilian power’ Europe is a term that carries greater irrelevance (Smith, 2000, 2005; Zielonka, 1998). Panayotis Tsakaloyannis (1989) claimed that the concept of ‘civilian power’ Europe died in the early 1980s due to the revitalisation of the Western European Union as a forum for independent defence discussion. Also, Karen Smith argues that,

“the stated intention of enhancing the EU’s military resources carries a price: it sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be used to further the EU’s interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too little” (Smith, 2000, p. 28).

Thus Smith (2005, p. 76) believes that ‘civilian power’ EU is definitely dead. However, academics have contrarily argued that the militarization of the EU does not in fact diminish the EU’s civilian power (Stavridis, 2001a, 2001b; Whitman, 2002; Larsen, 2002). Stavridis (2001a, p. 50) argues that a civilian power by design, rather than default, approach considers military means to be on one end of a long spectrum, with trade and use of economic sanctions on the other. Additionally, Larsen (2002, p. 292) argues that within the EU, “military means are articulated as part of a range of means for dealing with international problems, where civilian means continue to occupy a central position”. Whitman also argues that even if the EU develops a military capability, its civilian character remains intact in view of the secondary nature of its military means as opposed to the prime emphasis placed on economics and diplomacy (Whitman, 1998) cited in Tocci (2008, p. 5). Therefore, advocates of CPE point to the hybrid nature of the foreign policy instruments that are at the EU’s disposal. The possession of military means does not jeopardise the EU’s claim to be a civilian power. It is merely one foreign policy instrument that is available to use alongside economic and ‘soft’ instruments of foreign policy.
Military Power Europe

The idea of military power Europe has particularly found resonance with scholars since the development of ESDP. One of the first academics who argued that Europe needed to be a military power was Hedley Bull. Bull argues that ‘civilian power’ Europe was ineffective in international relations, and argued that military power still remained dominant. According to Bull (1982, p. 151), at the time of writing, “more generally, the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”. Bull argued that if the EC wanted to weigh considerable influence, it needed to develop substantially in its defence capabilities (ibid, p. 152). While Bull’s article was notably normative in nature, he seeks to demonstrate that it is difficult to be a ‘power’ on the global stage without strong military capabilities.

In the academic debate surrounding European defence policy, a turning point in the quest for improved military capabilities in the EU was the decision by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in 1998 to break free from the stagnation of progress in defence cooperation and argued that the Europeans should seek to act in international crises independently from the NATO framework. The resulting St. Malo Declaration, signed by Britain and France, insisted that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up my credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Saint-Malo Declaration, 1998). The fact that Britain had changed its immensely stubborn previous stance to military cooperation was of the utmost importance to this new drive towards improving the EU’s military capabilities (Hoffmann, 2000, p. 193). Therefore, since the advent of the ESDP, member states have clearly recognised the need to intensify cooperation and accelerate the progress towards an EU that is far more capable of intervening on the international stage (Howarth, 2007, p. 89). In fact, the EU has “broken a taboo” in contemplating questions of defence and military security (Whitman, 1998, p. 133). Therefore, the discourse and intentions of key European policymakers appear to point towards the direction of improved military capabilities and joint EU action in international crises.
In terms of current capabilities, McCormick argues that European military capabilities are in fact underappreciated. He writes that,

“Through Britain and France it has a significant nuclear capability, and the armed forces of its member states bring together substantial firepower: it has more active service military personnel than the United States, backed up by 12,000 artillery pieces, 3430 combat aircraft, more than 150 service naval vessels…and 82 submarines” (McCormick, 2007, p. 71).

He claims further that if there were a single European military, with a unified budget, all weapons and personnel pooled under a single command system, the EU would be the second biggest military power in the world (ibid, p. 71). Developments in the direction of autonomous military capabilities have been considerable in recent years (Sjursen, 2006a, p. 171). The ESDP has achieved much progress in enhancing member states’ military capabilities (Menon, 2009, p. 232). Menon writes that most member states are taking steps to improve their force-projection capabilities and the ESDP has had success in shifting the attitudes of some member states towards participation in military operations, such as Ireland and Germany (ibid, p. 233). Before then, deployments made by European militaries outside Europe were limited and largely part of UN peacekeeping missions (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004, p. 167). In terms of effective deployment of small military forces, Selden (2010, p. 411) identifies that the “stark contrast between the inability of European militaries to cope with the demands of the Balkan wars of the 1990s and their ability to operate in the distant and unforgiving environment of Afghanistan” is a clear indication of the efficient progress made by member states in this regard.

EU member states have demonstrated their willingness to enhance their military capabilities with various institutional developments. For example, the establishment of the European Defence Agency by a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers in July 2004 may be considered as a fundamental development in supporting member states in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management (Moustakis and Violakis, 2008, p. 422). The tasks of the EDA include developing defence capabilities to meet the capability needs of the ESDP, promoting European cooperation on defence equipment, and to promote Defence Research and Technology (European Defence Agency, 2010). The ESDP also now has a permanent bureaucracy in the form of the EU military
committee and military staff (Selden, 2010, p. 411), which directs all EU military activities and provides the Political and Security Committee with advice and recommendations on security matters (Council of the European Union, 2010). Therefore, EU member states have shown an interest in defence cooperation and military capabilities, thereby appearing to provide credibility to the military power Europe (MPE) thesis.

**Challenges to MPE**

However, the question must be asked as to whether the EU is completely committed to being a significant military power. One key factor to consider is the spending record of member states on aspects of their defence. According to Menon (2009, p. 234), most European states are simply not spending enough on defence, pointing out that, in 2005, Europe was the only region in the world where military spending decreased, by approximately 1.7 per cent. It is questionable as to whether the EU can actually afford to launch fully-fledged autonomous military actions. The EU does not have the capacity to keep up with US defence spending in the foreseeable future (Sangiovanni, 2003, p. 198). It is evident that given the current economic circumstances that Europe is faced with currently, it is likely that the build-up of defence capabilities may have to be sidelined as they are simply too expensive for member states governments. For instance, the intensive Strategic and Defence Security Review currently being undertaken by the British Government (Ministry of Defence, 2010) has attracted great attention from media commentators due to the likelihood of swingeing cuts for many defence projects. This is a vivid demonstration of the financial pressures that member state governments and their defence ministries face at this particular point in time.

The rapid development of the ESDP may be seen as a driving force towards greater military capabilities; however, there is considerable doubt amongst scholars that this in fact means that the EU is now a *de facto* military power, usurping the civilian nature of its foreign policy action. For example, one of the landmark decisions in the EU’s journey towards greater military action, the incorporation of the Petersburg tasks does not necessarily mean a departure from civilian power Europe. For some member states, these tasks are fully in conformity with civilian power norms (Whitman, 2006b, p. 113). For the EU’s traditionally neutral states, the development of civilian crisis management capabilities was a necessary complement to the development of military capabilities (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 181). The Balkans made it clear that ‘winning the war’ was insufficient, and that special
A key problem with the concept of MPE is the fact it has to contend with the differences in attitude that member states may have in terms of sending troop to fight abroad. In order for the EU to exist as a military power, as well as possessing the capabilities to act, the concept must assume that the ease of which agreement and cooperation can take place between the member states allows for decisive common action. European cooperation in foreign policy remains far short of an integrated foreign policy, underpinned by intensive transgovernmentalism among member state foreign ministries (Wallace, 2005, p. 455). This is most certainly the case with the decision to use military force. For example, the war in Bosnia during the early 1990s clearly exposed differences among EU member states with regards to the use of military force to stop the conflict (Gross, 2007, p. 99). Additionally, the ongoing war in Iraq has demonstrated differences in opinion over the deployment of troops there, with France and Germany leading the opposition within the EU against taking military action, whereby the UK was willing to follow the Americans with their preferred militaristic approach in Iraq. Each member state has their own strategic and political interest and military capabilities, and it seems that the concept of MPE suffers because of the inability of the EU to achieve consensus on issues of military importance. The problem of the EU’s historically neutral countries must also be considered as they could impair the effectiveness of an EU defence policy (Grant, 2000, p. 8). As Treacher (2004, p. 49) argues, the “political will/capacity of the Union’s leaders to actually deploy the new military instruments at their disposal in response to a new remains in doubt”. This will therefore remain a serious obstacle for the development of a military power Europe.

**Normative Power Europe**

The concept of normative power Europe is becoming increasingly attractive to EU practitioners and scholars. Manners has become a key supporter for this notion of Europe as a normative power. He (2002, p. 238) argues that “by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power. It is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power”. He criticises further the limits of civilian and military power by writing,
“One of the problems with the notions of civilian and military power is their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks. The concept of normative power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions and policies, and towards including cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic components” (ibid, p. 239).

Therefore, the emphasis of values is central to NPE. Rosecrance also argues that the EU is, in essence, a normative power. He (1998, p. 22) argues that, “Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical. Its attractive force is very great, and others will seek to be associated with it”, and it “is now coming to set world standards in normative terms”. Therefore, Rosecrance sees the EU as a new type of international actor, distinguishable from the traditional political and state-centric forms of power that have dominated international politics previously.

Analysing the EU’s normative basis, Manners (2002, pp. 242-243) has identified five ‘core’ norms and four ‘minor norms’ that comprise the Union’s acquis communautaire and acquis politique. The five core norms identified are the centrality of peace; the idea of liberty; and respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The four minor norms are the social solidarity; anti-discrimination; sustainable development; and the principle of good governance. He (ibid, p. 242) explains that its normative basis has been developed over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. Therefore, an analysis of some of these norms is crucial for a greater understanding of the credibility of the EU’s normative power.

In discourse from high-level European political figures, there appears to be a movement towards projecting the EU as a normative power, where values remain of the utmost importance in foreign policy. In a speech to the European Parliament, then Commission President, Romano Prodi stated,

“Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests…We have forged a model of development and continental
integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity – and it is a model that works (Prodi, 2000).

Additionally, Javier Solana, then High Representative of the CFSP also argued that “[Ordinary people] want us to be able to support democratic government, to defend human rights and the rule of law” (Larsen, 2002, p. 291, quoting Solana, 2000).

Therefore, senior European policy-makers have been extremely eager to portray the EU as a power that holds features contrary to traditional definitions of power. The discourse of normative power has become an increasingly important practice of European identity construction (Diez, 2005, p. 635). Diez identifies that a large part of this discourse establishes a normative identity for the EU through turning third parties into ‘others’ and representing the EU as a positive force in world politics, particularly citing the EU’s identification of Turkey as “an ideal other” (ibid, p. 633). This discourse generally suggests that the EU is a somewhat post-modern power in global politics, relying on portraying itself as a force for good in the world and spreading its values across the globe.

It is worthwhile considering the influential role that the EU has played in the area of one of its ‘core’ norms; human rights. This is one area that has attracted much research and scholarly work (Smith, 2001; Manners; 2002; Youngs, 2004a; Balfour, 2006; Sedelmeier, 2006). Smith (2001, p. 202) argues that compared to the situation at the start of the 1990s, human rights considerations in the EU’s external relations have radically changed, and now human rights form a significant part of the EU’s international identity. The Treaty on the European Union has stated that one of the EU’s objectives is to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, Title V, Article 11). The European Commission has also highlighted concerns for human rights and stated that “they should be an integral, or ‘mainstream’ consideration in all EU external policies (European Commission, 2001, p. 8). According to Smith (2001, p. 188), the EU promotes this respect for human rights through the application of political conditionality, the provision of aid for human rights programmes, and the use of diplomatic instruments, such as demarches and political dialogue. Undoubtedly, the promotion of human rights around the world is an activity that gives credence to the normative power Europe (NPE) thesis. As Balfour writes,
“No other large state has put on paper that its foreign policy objectives include international action in support of human rights...and has created a legal basis to do so; no other state has tied its relations with third countries to ‘human rights clauses’, no other regional or international organisation can wield the same power or influence to do so” (Balfour, 2006, p. 127).

Therefore, the protection of human rights has been advocated vigorously by the EU across the world. This is a particularly relevant norm to the case study of Operation Atalanta, which this dissertation will analyse below. The promotion of human rights is merely one value amongst many that the EU claims to hold. Normative power literature is increasing rapidly in scope in academic circles and claims a central place in the debate regarding the EU’s external identity.

Challenges to NPE

However, NPE has been subject to criticism for a wide variety of reasons (Youngs, 2004a; Hyde-Price, 2006; Sjursen, 2006b; Pace, 2007; Wood, 2009). Hyde-Price (2006) offers a neorealist analysis of NPE, arguing that this approach provides a more credible evaluation as to how the ESDP evolved. Hyde-Price traces the development of EU foreign and security policy and argues that systematic changes in the structural distribution of power have determined the shape of EU foreign policy. For example, in its dealings with the post-communist democracies of East Central Europe in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, “the EU was used by its most influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states” (ibid, pp. 226-227). Additionally, the EU shapes “its external milieu through using power in a variety of forms: political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion” (ibid, p. 227). Therefore, Hyde-Price places extreme importance on the existence of strategic interests of EU member states, which appear to go against the grain of the concept of the EU as a pure normative power. Civilian and military power retain their significance in a neorealist world.

Additionally, in a contemporary case study, Wood (2009) looks at the EU’s efforts to democratise Russia. He argues that when strategic interests are at stake, emphasising the
EU’s dependency on Russian energy supplies, the EU’s ability to project its ‘community of values’ remains vulnerable. The EU’s reliance on energy from Russia means that EU’s capacity and commitment to exist as a normative power in its relations with Russia suffer as a result (ibid, p. 125). According to Wood,

“The EU’s mission civilisatrice is susceptible to a relatively straightforward if unpleasant realpolitik that can expose a rhetoric-behaviour gap…When faced with resistance to a (potentially) vigorous promotion of democracy and human rights…the EU appears a rather powerless normative power” (ibid, p. 128).

The strength of this argument seems to raise doubts about the credibility of NPE. Other commentators have also argued that the EU has demonstrated inconsistency in its normative identity when strategic interests are under threat. For example, Tocci (2008) argues that the EU’s desire for a positive relationship with Israel has undermined its normative discourse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She claims that while the EU has energetically called for international humanitarian law to be respected (most notably opposing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories), the EU has risked acquiescing to Israel’s violations of international law by extending EU trade benefits to settlement enterprises (ibid, p. 19). Additionally, Pace (2007) has identified the breach of the EU’s normative principles in their lack of acknowledgement for the governing Hamas after the January 2006 Palestinian elections. Pace argues that in Palestinian eyes, the EU’s sceptical response to the outcome of this election appeared to ignore the democratic choice of the Palestinian people. Therefore, this reaction stands in stark contrast to EU promotion of fair, free and transparent elections as a crucial dimension of the much needed democratisation momentum in Palestine. For the EU, the democratic success of Islamist parties does not seem to feature on the EU’s normative radar (ibid, p. 1060). Therefore, in this constantly delicate area, the EU has wavered in its normative approach to the conflict.

This is very much a concern expressed by some in the area of human rights. Despite the growth in concern in human rights around the world mentioned above in the essay, the EU actually demonstrates inconsistency in its human rights policy. Even though Smith recognises the greater recognition by the EU of human rights, she (2001, p. 193) warns that “considerations of human rights compete with political, security and commercial
considerations in foreign policy-making and states ignore human rights violations in ‘friendly’ or ‘important’ countries”. She (ibid, pp. 195-97) further argues that the EU has engaged in this behaviour on a number of occasions, particularly in its relationships with Russia and China, where enormous strategic, commercial and political interests are at stake. Youngs (2004a) has also argued that in the area of human rights, the EU’s strategic interests are a vital factor. He (ibid, p. 424) identifies that these interests ensured that Yassir Arafat was heavily supported to the detriment of civil society human rights groups, who saw their aid diverted away towards the state apparatus. Therefore, there has been criticism of the EU’s normative approach in academic circles, particularly in human rights. This presents a challenge to the concept of NPE due to the apparent neorealist tendencies of the EU and its member states and the importance of self-regarding interests in international relations.

Additionally, another challenge to NPE is the apparent increasing militarization of the EU since the announcement of the ESDP, many features of which have been outlined above as part of the assessment of MPE earlier in this dissertation. It is in fact Manners, one of the original advocates on NPE, who has argued that the recent militarization of the EU has risked jeopardising the EU’s normative basis. According to Manners,

“as the recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, in situations where the EU may be seeking to shape post-conflict reconstruction, the mixing of military, political, civilian, and humanitarian agenda is both guaranteed and dangerous. Ultimately, the introduction of EU military forces in theatres and settings where only EU civilian staff once worked risks undermining the EU’s peaceful normative power in favour of a more robust , and potentially violent, presence…” (Manners, 2006, p. 194).

However, what Manners fails to identify is that the deployment of military force is sometimes necessary to achieve normative ends. On occasions in EU foreign action, the norms of peace, the rule of law and justice have all required military means in order to be achieved. For example, Noutcheva argues that in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the EU’s emphasis on democratic development and the rule of law in Kosovo was a key objective of the mission. To achieve these goals, many EU member states directly took part in the 1999 military strikes against the Milosevic regime (Tocci, 2008, pp. 15-16). Diplomacy alone would most likely not have been sufficient enough to stop the violations of the Albanian population’s human rights in
Kosovo. Therefore, military capabilities can in fact enforce the EU’s normative basis and spread certain values. Additionally, in Operations Artemis and Atalanta, which I will analyse further below, the use of military force by the EU was a key part in keeping the peace in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo and off the shores of Somalia respectively. Normative power alone may not be persuasive enough on some occasions to influence other states and groups to alter their lawless behaviour. The threat or the use of military power is greatly needed to influence norms around the world, and therefore, enable the EU to maintain its normative power.

**Case Study 1. Operation Artemis**

**Context of EU involvement**

Operation Artemis is a landmark mission for the EU because it is the first time the EU had launched its first fully autonomous crisis management military action outside Europe which has not used NATO assets (Faria, 2004, p. 39). In 2003, Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province in the DRC, had been the scene of violent confrontations between Ugandan, Rwandan and Congolese armed forces, variously backed by a range of local tribal militias in the war which has convulsed the DRC since 1998 (Howorth, 2007, p. 233). They had fought for power and control over the resources of Ituri. In April 2003, the long awaited Ituri Interim Administration, a power-sharing assembly convened by MONUC (the UN Mission in the Congo), was established, opening the way for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the province. However, the departure of the Ugandan forces created a security vacuum that MONUC was unable to fill (Mace, 2003, p. 5). During the regional conflict, gross atrocities had been conducted on a massive scale, and an estimated 50,000 men, women and children had been killed since 2003 (Ulriksen et al, 2004, p. 510).

Consequently, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for deploying an interim multinational force to the region, in order the stabilise the situation, until MONUC could be reinforced. France then came forward and agreed to participate under the banner of the EU. The mission mandate lasted from June 12th until September 1st 2003. In September, the responsibility for the region was transferred back to MONUC. During Operation Artemis, France acted as the ‘framework nation’, providing the bulk of personnel in the mission.
Demonstration of the EU’s civilian power

Using Maull’s (1990) emphasis on cooperation as a key feature of civilian power, during Operation Artemis it is clear that the EU had worked with international and non-governmental organisations in order to stabilise the situation in Bunia. In terms of cooperation with the United Nations, academics have argued that EU-UN relations had been greatly enhanced with the experiences of the operation. Firstly, according to Martinelli (2006, p. 385), the operation “was a sign of UN-EU cooperation and it represented in concrete terms what the ESS would later term ‘effective multilateralism’”. As Faria (2004, p. 47) also writes, Operation Artemis “reinforced EU links with the UN in the area of crisis management” and that “there was good cooperation with the UN, on the ground as well as at the highest political level”. Additionally, Gourlay claims that Artemis “improved the EU’s operational relationship with the UN. The EU’s positive and quick response to the Secretary General Kofi Annan’s appeal to act helped build confidence in the EU’s ability to provide assistance to the UN, and this was consolidated by the multi-level dialogue between the two organisations (Gourlay, 2003, p. 4).

Undoubtedly, the EU demonstrated its ability to effectively cooperate with the UN and fulfilled the mandate provided by the UN efficiently. During the military operation, direct reporting from Javier Solana to the UN Security Council frequently occurred (Homan, 2007, p. 154). The operational experiences of Artemis even set the stage for the signing of the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Coordination in Crisis Management on September 24th 2003 (Jakobsen, 2007, p. 181). Additionally, the EU’s willingness to help the UN also showed that the EU had respect for what the UN was trying to achieve in the DRC and were willing to work with the organisation to help this process. Therefore, the EU certainly demonstrated effective multilateralism during the operation.

Another civilian feature of the EU’s actions in the DRC was the close cooperation with humanitarian agencies on the ground in Bunia. Throughout Artemis, the EU was keen to communicate with humanitarian NGOs in order to ensure that conditions in Bunia would be drastically better once the UN took over the mandate from the EU force. The French command of Artemis had placed a civil-military liaison officer immediately on the ground.
along with the first French troops in Bunia. Consequently, the officer was able to create a
good dialogue with humanitarian agencies (Faria, 2004, p. 45). The relationship with
humanitarian agencies was therefore strong (Irrera and Attinà, 2009, p. 19). These good
relations enabled NGOs to play an invaluable role in the disarmament, demobilisation and
rehabilitation programmes in Bunia in cooperation with Artemis (Hazelzet, 2006, p. 572).
Therefore, it appears fair to claim that the EU viewed NGOs on the ground as extremely
important in ensuring the success of the operation. Thereby, this provides another example of
the EU’s acceptance of cooperation within Artemis.

However, Ulriksen et al (2004, p. 515) argue that there was no senior EU civilian
representative working with the operation commander to help link the military side of the
operation to broader civilian activities in the region. They identify that, despite supporting
NGOs in Bunia to build capacity in the local police, the EU made no direct contact with the
programme whatsoever. However, NGOs were generally accepted as vital in the stabilisation
process. The advantage of humanitarian agencies from the point of view of the military forces
was their deep knowledge on the ground (Faria, 2004, p. 45). Therefore the EU was
extremely keen to cooperate with NGOs in order to achieve peace in Bunia.

Additionally, in terms of cooperation with the UN, there were some problems caused by the
lack of communication by the EU. There was little direct communication between what
would become the operational headquarters of the IEMF and MONUC during the pre-
deployment period. Later, MONUC was not warned of the landing of the first IEMF troops.
This was due to the IEMF leadership not trusting the security of information in MONUC
sufficiently to place their landing forces as risk (United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices
Unit, 2004, p. 11). This seems a basic requirement when deploying troops under a UN
mandate. However, the increased confidence of relations between the EU and the UN as a
result of the mission suggests that cooperation between the two organisations was generally
positive and frequent.

**Demonstration of the EU’s military power**

Firstly, it is to the credit of the EU, and in particular France as the framework nation, that
they persuaded ten other EU member states and five non-EU countries to contribute
personnel to Operation Artemis. This seems to suggest that the EU can collaborate effectively
to ensure that enough troops are available to act successful in civilian crisis management operations. As this was the first ESDP mission that acted without the need for NATO assets, this feat was quite impressive. As various academics have pointed out (Ulriksen et al, 2004; Youngs, 2004b; Bayart, 2004), Artemis was carried out in the wake of the controversial choice that member states had as to whether they would send help the military operation in Iraq. The fact that the EU, and particularly France, Germany and the United Kingdom, could agree to carry out a joint operation in the wake of rifts regarding involvement in Iraq demonstrates that the EU has the will to come together and deploy military forces. As Piccolino (2010, p. 126) argues, “The ability of the European institutions to give a prompt response to the UN demand was maybe the greatest success of Artemis”. Artemis also suggested that EU showed the political will to go beyond its traditional trade and aid instruments in order to stabilise a region of conflict (Faria, 2004, p. 47). This, therefore, provides positive evidence for the MPE thesis.

Additionally, the swift nature of the deployment of personnel in Bunia has shown that the EU has the ability to act efficiently in military operations. Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe, Deputy Director General and Chief of Staff in the Council of the European Union, declared to the New Defence Agenda in the immediate aftermath of the operation that Artemis that the EU had the autonomous capacity to react rapidly at a distance of 6500km (Gourlay, 2003, p. 4). Even though Ulriksen et al (2004, p. 515) argue that this can be explained by the fact that the French had begun to plan for the operation even before the Council had initiated the EU planning process in the joint action of June 5th, it still demonstrated that the EU could deploy troops within a relatively short period of time.

However, due to the operation’s limited mandate, it could hardly have been seen as a challenging test for the EU’s military capabilities. In military terms, France could have done it alone (ibid, p. 521). Therefore, this raises the question as to whether the EU actually needed to possess significant military capabilities at all in order to be successful here. As Gourlay (2003, p. 4) argues, “It does not necessarily follow from the successful conclusion of Operation Artemis that the EU’s capabilities are sufficient to conduct operations with more challenging mandates, requiring more robust use of force”. In terms of analysing whether the EU acted with great military power in this intervention, the mission may have succeeded, but politicians “could have announced the mission successful prior to its deployment given the
limited mandate that was bound to succeed” (Manners, 2006, p. 190). Thus, it is extremely difficult to claim that the EU acted as a convincing and confident military power throughout Artemis.

However, surprisingly, EU member states expressed initial doubts regarding the operation as they felt that the ESDP was not yet ready to tackle a situation as unstable as the Bunia crisis (Mace, 2003, p. 5). The DRC had gained a reputation as one the worst conflict areas in the world. However, for EU member states to hold this apprehension towards deploying troops for a limited period of time with a limited course of action hardly seems to portray the EU as a military power. Perhaps this reflects the major concern that the EU simply does not have sufficient military capabilities to act effectively in military operations around the world. According to Faria (2004, p. 48), even though it was successful, Artemis highlighted the increasing need to address military capabilities, notably that few member states, apart from France and the United Kingdom, have the capacity to deploy and command such operations. The fact that France was keen to provide a large bulk of the personnel perhaps masks the contribution of the EU as a whole. Academic attention has also focused on the weaknesses of the operation, notably with transport and logistics (Ulriksen et al, 2004, p. 515), and communications and intelligence sharing (Faria, 2004, p. 44). Considering the US is leading military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while EU member states are deploying limited amounts of troops in these efforts, it would seem unfair to label the EU as a ‘military power’ in the same vein as the US may be labelled this. In order to become a military power, it is essential for the EU to heavily enhance their military capabilities even further.

**Demonstration of the EU’s normative power**

It is relatively difficult to distinguish between NPE and CPE in peacekeeping operations, as much academic research emphasises the civilian nature of missions and keeping the peace is often tied in with this. However, this essay will associate NPE in this case study with the underlying humanitarian objective of the mission, to enforce peace within Bunia. The humanitarian objectives of Operation Artemis, stated by the UN Security Council, were

“to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the

Therefore, Operation Artemis gave the EU an opportunity to come forward and actively display its belief in the values of peace and the rule of law. Its willingness to act and rapid response seemed to suggest that the EU were extremely committed to ensuring that the norms that it held were allowed to become a reality in this part of Africa. In order to observe whether the EU acted and ensured that the changed situation in Bunia was consistent with its norms, it is also essential to evaluate whether Artemis was a success and whether the EU were able to achieve peace and re-establish the rule of law.

European policy makers judged Operation Artemis as highly successful (Youngs, 2004b, p. 318). The security situation in Bunia had improved significantly and the threat posed to the civilian population by militias in Bunia and the surrounding area diminished considerably as a result of the operation. Additionally, a significant number of refugees had returned to Bunia (Faria, 2004, p. 43). If we also take another of Manners’ norms, the importance of good governance, Operation Artemis ensured that the Interim Ituri Administration and the Ituri Assembly were able to resume their work (ibid, p. 43). Overall, the EU appeared to take great steps to ensure that its own values were spreading within Bunia.

However, Artemis has attracted criticism in term of its apparent inability to fully keep the peace in Ituri. According to the International Crisis Group (2003, p. 3), the intervention was completely insufficient, and the EU intervention needed to be longer in order to achieve sustainable peace. Mass atrocities continued against the civilian population in large parts of Ituri throughout the operation (Ulriksen et al, 2004, p. 520). According to Youngs (2004b, p. 318), “there was something tragic-comic in the EU claiming resounding success against this background of intensified butchery”. Additionally, Militiamen were not disarmed, but simply driven out of town, thereby allowing weapons still to be in the hands of fighting groups. Thereby, conflict and fighting was still rife in the Ituri province. However, given their limited mandate decided by the UN and the fact that the UN bore primary responsibility for maintaining the peace, it is difficult to imagine that the EU could have done more (Piccolino, 2010, p. 127). Therefore, these apparent failings of the mission cannot be blamed fully on the EU’s lack of their normative commitment to peace. Operation Artemis accomplished much in
the humanitarian sense within its mandate and therefore, the EU had been successful in demonstrating its commitment to peace.

However, a school of thought has emerged that suggests that humanitarian and normative reasons actually played a secondary role in Operation Artemis and that more selfish and strategic reasons were in the minds of major European policy makers. According to Gegout (2005, p. 437), French President Jacques Chirac realised that an intervention into Bunia would be the ideal case to prove the capacity of the EU to act autonomously from NATO. Additionally, EU military staff talked in terms of ‘testing the machinery’ of decision-making and implementation of the ESDP (Youngs, 2004, p. 318). Braud also labels the DRC as ‘a laboratory for CFSP’ (Piccolino, 2010, p. 127, quoting Braud, 2007, p. 5). Therefore, there seems to be various academics that identify this motivation of testing the EU’s military capacity to act as playing a huge part in Operation Artemis. Additionally, as one British diplomatic source said regarding the wishes of the French to gather a multinational force for the conflict in Bunia, “we British told them, why not make it an EU operation, that will show the world that the EU is capable of sharp end operations as well provide a testing ground for such in Africa” (Matlary, 2009, p. 126). Therefore, we must question the wish of the EU political and military elite to purely keep the peace in the DRC.

**Operation Artemis Conclusions**

In Artemis, the EU has demonstrated civilian power, whereby the EU has acted through cooperation with various organisations; military power, through a swift deployment of troops; and normative power, namely acting to ensure peaceful conditions in Bunia. The EU had shown a commitment to maintaining peace in the conflict-stricken region and played a vital humanitarian role in ensuring that civilians were kept safe. However, the opportunity for the major powers of the EU to show that the ESDP did indeed have the capacity to act independently from NATO raises much doubt about how much the EU really wanted to diffuse its normative value of peace in Bunia. In terms of military power, the EU responded extremely quickly to the UN’s request, the mission attracted various degrees of contribution from different member states and the speed at which troops were deployed was impressive. However, questions remain about how much it could tell practitioners and academics about the real military capabilities of the EU and ESDP. The initial concerns regarding the military prowess of the EU and the likelihood of success in the mission amongst member states
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appear to demonstrate that labelling the EU as a ‘military power’ may seem premature and inaccurate. The EU’s civilian power was demonstrated by its commitment to cooperation and communication with the UN and humanitarian agencies in Bunia. Despite the initial shortcomings of communication between the EU and the UN, the coordination between the two organisations was a key feature of the mission and it laid the foundations for greater cooperation in the future. In addition, the importance that the EU gave to NGOs and agencies on the ground was another indicator of the EU’s civilian approach in the mission. Therefore, the EU’s civilian power was considerably evident, whilst doubts existed over the EU’s military and normative power in Operation Artemis.

Case Study 2. Operation Atalanta

Context of EU involvement

Operation Atalanta is the first naval operation conducted by the EU and therefore provides a new challenge for the capabilities of the ESDP. There has been fighting in Somalia between groups and clans for almost two decades. As a result, lawlessness is common and much of the population lives in extreme poverty (German Federal Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence, 2009, p. 30). Responding to the crisis, UN World Food Programme (WFP) ships have attempted to deliver food to starving Somalis, but they have been the target of consistent attacks by pirates. Piracy is one of several transnational criminal activities described as a threat by the EU and its member states (Germond and Smith, 2009, p. 579). Piracy off the coast of Somalia has grown at an alarming rate and constantly threatens to disrupt international trade. It provides funds that feed the war in Somalia and could potentially become a weapon of international terrorism or a cause of environmental disaster (Middleton, 2008, p. 3). Therefore, piracy off the coast of Somalia has attracted the attention of EU policy-makers.

On 15th September 2008, the Council of the European Union launched a military coordination action, EU NAVCO, to support surveillance and protection operations in Somalia and off the Somali coast. This was established within the framework of UN Security Council resolution 1816, which allows states to support the transitional government in Somalia in the fight against piracy and armed robbery (Council of the European Union, 2008a, p. 1). As with Operation Artemis, France took the lead in attempting to form a multinational EU force to
William Trott combat piracy. On 8th December 2008, the Council authorised the deployment of troops in a military operation under the framework of the ESDP. This was to contribute further to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery in the region, including through the use of force if necessary (Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 1). On 14th June 2010, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the military operation for another two years until 12th December 2010. Therefore, this is an ongoing operation that has involved a wide number of EU and non-EU member states and international organisations.

Demonstration of the EU’s civilian power

One major feature of Operation Atalanta has been the cooperation between member states in order to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the shores of Somalia. The EU is working with countries such as China, India, Japan, Russia, Pakistan, Malaysia and Turkey in the anti-piracy effort. Russia, China and India have particularly coordinated their action with that of the European forces (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009a, p. 9). France and the United States have especially collaborated closely in order to formulate UN resolution 1816 (ibid, p. 8). Therefore, this global effort to counter piracy has encouraged close coordination between the EU and its partners in the grander strategy of anti-piracy action. Here, the EU has demonstrated again one of Maull’s (1990) features of civilian power, the emphasis on cooperation and communication to tackle threats in the world. There has been little sense of desire for unilateral action from any nation involved and collaboration has been central in this effort. As a consequence of this effort, there is the potential that the EU will encourage further multilateral security cooperation with non-EU member states in the future and other states may be more willing to respond to EU leadership in the future (Germond and Smith, 2009, pp. 588-89). This bodes well for the EU as a civilian power.

The fact that the EU has also signed agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles regarding prosecuting detained pirates shows that the EU is clearly willing to work with others within the delicate area of rules of engagement. Rather than attempting to prosecute detainees in EU courts, the EU has tried to look for alternative partners in this respect. Additionally, the EU has sought to sign similar agreements with other governments of the region, including those of Djibouti and Tanzania (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009b, p. 16). Of course, these types of agreements are sought due to the legal uncertainties of detaining pirates in Europe. European courts may decline jurisdiction and pirates may seek asylum in Europe.
under international law (Seibert, 2008). Therefore, cooperation here appears as a legal necessity, rather than a genuine choice made by the EU. However, collaboration has been obvious in strategy and legal terms, and this has helped the EU demonstrate its civilian power in this operation.

The importance of trade and aid, key planks of CPE, are central to the EU’s actions in counter-piracy efforts. Pirate raids severely threaten maritime trade, which damages the European and the global economy. Approximately 20 per cent of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden (Germond and Smith, 2009, p. 580). It is the world’s second busiest shipping route (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009a, p. 4), and therefore retains paramount importance to economies all over the world. Therefore, the fact that the EU is willing to combat the pirates to protect the free flow of trade suggests that the EU is willing to preserve something that is fundamental to its identity as a civilian power, its position as the global trading power. Also, as already mentioned, piracy constitutes a great threat to the delivery of aid to the Somali population. Protecting WFP vessels is one of the main objectives of Operation Atalanta, and it is only appropriate that, as a civilian power, the EU plays a role in ensuring that people receive the aid they need. The EU has played this role successfully. By the end of 2009, 267,000 metric tonnes of food aid have been delivered to Somalia under EU protection (Keohane, 2009, p. 2). The operation has attracted praise from policymakers for its success in protecting WFP aid ships (House of Lords, 2010, p. 9; EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 2009, p. 4).

Achievements in protecting maritime trade and aid can be considered to help the EU gain the identity of being an effective military power. However, it is also an indication of the commitment of the EU to protect trade and aid, which are undoubtedly parts of the EU’s political and economic external identity. Therefore, this demonstrates additionally that CPE is very much an appropriate term in Operation Atalanta.

**Demonstration of the EU’s military power**

Various journalists are extremely interested in the success of Operation Atalanta, as it could be seen as a test of the ongoing development of the EU’s military capabilities. Some ask whether success might bring Europe one step closer to becoming a real military power (Farley and Gortzak, Foreign Policy, 3rd December 2008). As the EU had never attempted a naval operation, Atalanta provides a fascinating demonstration of the ability of the EU to
exercise military power at sea. During Atalanta, the EU has faced various operational challenges that provide a stern test for the EU’s military capabilities. The fact that naval operations will have to cover a sizeable area and will have to act at great speed to prevent pirate attacks were challenges identified prior to launch (Seibert, 2008). Overall the military operation so far has generally been positive. In the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, there has been a marked decrease in the number of night time attacks and a sizeable reduction in the number of successful attacks (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009b, p. 15). Dr. Lee Willet of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies points out that the operation had been launched in the space of ten weeks, which for “something of this size and significance is quite an achievement” (House of Lords, 2010, p. 9). Additionally, Atalanta ships have played a vital part in protecting many shipments by the WFP (Germond and Smith, 2009, p. 589). In fact Rear Admiral Hudson, former Operation Commander of Atalanta, has claimed that the operation had a 100 per cent successful record in protecting WFP vessels (House of Lords, 2010, p. 9). Eight EU member states are making a permanent operational contribution to the mission. Additionally, the operation has attracted the contribution of third countries, such as Norway, and several other EU countries have offered military personnel to supplement the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters in the UK (EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2010). Therefore, the ESDP throughout the mission has demonstrated its ability to effectively act in maritime circumstances. Therefore, undoubtedly it has been strengthened by this experience.

Inevitably, questions have been raised about the military capabilities of the EU considering the scale of the maritime zone within the operation. There has doubts raised regarding the amount of frigates the EU has used (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009a, p. 17). There was also a gap in the operation’s knowledge regarding pirate activity on land in Somalia (House of Lords, 2010, p. 11). Surveillance capability shortfalls have also been identified in Atalanta (ibid, p. 12). The European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence state that capability shortfalls apparent in the operation are

“mainly due to a combination of overstretch of military commitments for some Member States, plus a more general problem of a lack of resources for new capabilities due to static or declining defence budgets and a patchy record in transforming European defence since the
end of the Cold War” (EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 2009, p. 4).

However, despite these obstacles faced by member states, Operation Atalanta has been impressive in its achievements. According to Germond and Smith (2009, pp. 573-74), Atalanta increasingly defies “the expectations of many sceptics of the ESDP, who have argued for years that the EU will remain subordinate to NATO as it would never be able to coordinate its own joint military operations”. The operation has demonstrated that the ESDP is able to handle naval missions, and therefore, has proved that it can perform this role in the future if necessary. This operation has ensured that the EU has taken another step towards becoming a military power.

**Demonstration of the EU’s normative power**

Similarly to the EU’s role in the DRC in 2003, peace was the central goal in Operation Atalanta, in which maritime peace in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia was the issue at stake. As well as providing protection for merchant and WFP vessels, one of the operations’ aims was to “employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present” (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 1). Therefore, the EU’s desire to show its commitment to maritime peace is certainly apparent here. In 2009, the EU had been successful in deterring several pirate attacks and handed over 68 pirates for prosecution (Keohane, 2009, p. 2). As a result, the EU has considerably helped in keeping peace around these waters. Additionally, advocates of this operation framed the mission as not just a measured response to a known threat, but also as an opportunity to spread European values (Germond and Smith, p. 583). European-level politicians such as former commander on the UN forces in Bosnia and French MEP, Philippe Morillon, and Vice-President of the Commission, Antonio Tajani, have emphasised the importance of values in Atalanta (ibid, p. 583). In political discourse, values seemed to be a prominent feature of the justification to launch the operation. These values are not explicitly stated but are most likely to mean the EU’s commitment to peace, the rule of law and justice.

One particular value that has been demonstrated by the EU in Operation Atalanta is the importance of human rights in international society. The issue of how to handle detained
pirates was certainly a problem in debate prior to the mission. Handing pirates over to Somali authorities would raise the issue of Somalia’s record of human rights violations (Seibert, 2008). This, consequently, would threaten the EU’s normative basis as a promoter of human rights around the world. However, as mentioned above, at the end of February 2009, the EU adopted an extradition agreement making provision for the prosecution in Kenya of certain pirates arrested by EUNAVFOR. An agreement has also been reached with the Seychelles for the prosecution of detained pirates. Therefore, it is now possible to bring them to trial in accordance with international law on human rights (Assembly of Western European Union, 2009a, p. 16). In March 2010, EU High Representative Baroness Ashton sought to open negotiations with Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda with a view to concluding further transfer agreements (House of Lords, 2010, p. 14). Therefore, throughout the operation, the EU has considered the exercise of human rights extremely important, and has worked with other countries to ensure that detained pirates are treated in accordance with international law rather than sending them to face trial in Somalia. This action has therefore contributed to the body of evidence that suggests that the EU is a normative power, especially in the field of human rights promotion.

However, much like realist interpretations about the justifications for launching Operation Artemis in the DRC, explanations for launching Atalanta have attracted a realist conclusion as well. Despite Germond and Smith (2009, pp. 580-81) acknowledging different dimensions to EU interests in this region, such as the pirates’ links to wider terrorism networks and the maritime environment, they also argue (ibid, p. 584) that French President Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to use the EU in this instance to foster France’s rank on the world stage and bolster his desire to strengthen the ESDP by giving it a naval dimension. In addition, Britain was reluctant to let France claim sole credit for any European naval operation and therefore became involved (ibid, p. 587). Geoffrey Van Orden, a British Conservative MEP has also expressed his doubts regarding the motivations for the operation, arguing that “NATO is best able to mount such an operation on behalf of the UN” and that “the EU is desperate to find military operations that it can stick its flag on in order to give credibility to its defence pretensions” (Waterfield, Telegraph, 19th November 2008). It is tempting to point out that, as Operation Atalanta is the first naval operation performed by the EU, major member states would merely view it as mainly an opportunity to demonstrate what the ESDP is capable of. However, whether or not it is necessary to perform this type of operation under the banner of
the EU and the ESDP, the EU has acted consistently with the norms and values it holds in Atalanta, both in its desire to safeguard maritime peace off the coast of Somalia, and in particularly, its efforts to ensure that the human rights of detained pirates are protected.

**Operation Atalanta Conclusions**

Throughout Operation Atalanta, the EU has demonstrated its civilian power, through its commitment to protect trade route and aid vessels from piracy attacks and its cooperation with non-EU countries; military power, due to the success of the operation so far; and its normative power through its commitment to maintaining maritime peace and desire to respect the human rights of detained pirates. Through political discourse claiming that the mission was about spreading European values and the central objective of ensuring that peace became the norm, the EU has wanted to demonstrate its normative basis in this operation. However, the EU’s respect for human rights is most clearly evident due to the efforts it has made to approach countries that are willing to try detained pirates in accordance with international law, rather than sending them to be prosecuted in Somalia where detainees are at risk of seeing their human rights violated. The EU has demonstrated its normative power by pursuing and achieving this respect for human rights. In terms of military power, the EU has demonstrated that it can be an effective actor in maritime security as well as on land. The mission is addressing its objectives efficiently. Criticisms have been made regarding specific shortfalls of the operation and various member states are overstretched in their military commitments. However, in its first naval mission, the EU has demonstrated that it has the capacity to use force at sea with success. Therefore, its military and operational capabilities must be applauded in this respect. The EU has certainly demonstrated its civilian power to a great degree. Its emphasis on cooperation with non-EU states in order to tackle the problem of piracy has shown the value of multilateralism in international relations, which is one of the key tenets of a civilian power. The protection of trade and aid shipments around the region has also demonstrated the high value that the EU places on economic instruments of foreign policy. Operation Atalanta has demonstrated the three forms of power clearly, but most notably, it has shown that the EU has taken a great step in developing into a credible military power. Inevitably, other countries possess stronger military capabilities, but the operation has shown that the EU can work together and create a positive impression as a security actor.
Conclusion

This dissertation has analysed the features of civilian, military and normative power, the challenges that these types of power face, and how the EU has demonstrated these types of power in Operations Artemis and Atalanta. In terms of civilian power Europe, using Maull’s definition of civilian power, the EU has shown that it is eager to tackle international situations multilaterally and it exercises a tremendous amount of economic power through its considerable emphasis on the importance of trade and aid in international relations. However, its trading dominance now faces new threats with the growth of economic powers such as China and India, and various scholars have expressed doubts regarding the EU’s civilian power by arguing that the increasing militarization of the EU is incompatible with the notion of civilian power, a primarily non-military concept. In Operations Artemis and Atalanta, the emphasis on cooperation with various other member states and the UN has been a key demonstration of the EU’s civilian power at work. In Atalanta, the EU’s willingness to protect trade and aid vessels from pirate attacks shows their commitment to protecting economic instruments of foreign policy and civilian forms of power. The development of military capabilities within the EU since the creation of the ESDP has been rapid. The EU has conducted effective military operations, namely Operations Artemis and Atalanta. Atalanta has been particularly impressive as the operation is the EU’s first naval mission and it has been extremely successful so far. Even though the EU does not have the military capacity of a military power such as the US, it has demonstrated that it can deploy military instruments effectively to achieve humanitarian ends. However, there have been high-profile divisions in recent years when it has come to undertaking military action, such as during the Bosnian and Iraq wars. Therefore, the EU needs to consistently reach agreement on military and security policy in order for it to be considered a real military power in the world. The fact that the deployment of military forces is an extremely delicate and emotive decision for some member states does little to improve the likelihood for a cohesive security policy amongst the member states. NPE has been the subject of an increasing amount of research and debate. Human rights and peace have been particular norms that the EU has been keen to demonstrate and spread throughout the world. In Operations Artemis and Atalanta, these norms have been considered to be fundamental in the objectives and the conduct of the missions. Throughout Atalanta, the considerations for the human rights of detained pirates by the EU were very much evident. However, many scholars have placed considerable
importance on strategic interests in foreign policy. For example, the EU’s role in the Israeli-Palestine conflict and its relations with Russia has demonstrated that the EU’s strategic interests are occasionally prioritised by member states over their normative basis. Additionally, similarly to the concerns regarding the EU’s civilian power, the gradual increase of military capabilities has cast doubt on the EU’s claims to exercise normative power. However, military means may have to be used in order to achieve civilian and humanitarian ends. Operations Artemis and Atalanta have demonstrated that the deployment of forces has been essential in order to protect the lives of citizens and preserve the process of trading and transferring aid respectively. Military force was necessary in order to keep the peace in these operations. Therefore, the increasing development of military capacity and willingness of the EU to use force does not necessarily undermine the EU’s civilian and normative power. Due to the emphasis that the EU places on multilateralism and on its trade and aid interests, the most appropriate label for the EU as a global actor is that of a civilian power.

References


