

Problems of Nationalism and Democracy in Zimbabwe and Tanzania

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This article traces the emergence of deepening political violence in the wake of recent multiparty elections in Zimbabwe and Tanzania, a trend reducible neither to 'primordial' identity politics nor economic crisis induced by structural adjustment policies. The article argues that this growing political violence must be situated within the context of the unravelling of the nationalist coalitions that coalesced around the dominant incumbent parties and their nation building projects: the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), Swahili for 'Revolutionary Party', of Tanzania. Through an extended discussion of the post-independence period the article traces the shaky nature of the nationalist coalitions from their inceptions through to the multiparty era, drawing particular attention to the opposition strongholds of Matabeleland and Zanzibar. In concluding the paper addresses what democratization may portend for similar regime types in Africa.

Key words: democracy; nationalism; nation-building; Zimbabwe; Tanzania; Matabeleland; Zanzibar; transition; liberation; ZANU-PF; CCM; MDC; CUF.

Introduction: The Genesis of Political Conflict in Zimbabwe and Tanzania

Speaking in Zanzibar on the occasion of the 41st anniversary celebrations of the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, in 2005, at which he was the official guest of honour, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe exclaimed to a packed stadium:

It is a great honour to be with you as you celebrate 41 years of the Zanzibar Revolution. Zimbabwe and Zanzibar have a common historical background . . . In 1964, Zanzibar brought great changes to its people by refusing to bow to colonialists. The same happened in Zimbabwe a few years later. . . You distributed your land to indigenous Zanzibaris, we did the same to our people, we must not turn back.¹

Mugabe went on to say that his country had been under external pressure, mainly from Britain and the USA, who had imposed sanctions to force Zimbabwe to reverse its land reform. Mugabe vowed not to kneel down to any pressure to reverse his land reform programme and urged Zanzibaris and Tanzanians themselves to forge greater unity against the external pressures of the West: 'My country today faces vilification by the West . . . Like you, we have refused to yield to any sell out deals,' said Mugabe.² Mugabe cited the 2001 political accord between the ruling CCM, and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), as exemplary, saying it was reached without the help of Western countries. For his part, Zanzibar President Amani Abeid Karume extolled the benefits wrought by the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, claiming CCM policy achievements in social provision, agriculture, and tourism, based on growth rates averaging 6.5% between 2000 and 2004. This ceremony is striking for a number of reasons. For one, the presence of Mugabe at this event exemplifies the extent to which both regimes are finding common cause around the twin themes of unity and developmentalism, and 'liberation' and liberal democracy.³ Perhaps more disturbingly though, Mugabe's stern presence on the podium amongst the CCM elite conveyed a warning that the spectres of violence would do a 'replay' against those opponents seeking to overturn the 'revolutionary' verdicts of 1964 and 1980.⁴

Zimbabwe and Tanzania were long thought to be exemplary cases of relatively peaceful, stable African states. In 1997, Liisa Laakso argued that the 1995 elections in Zimbabwe and Tanzania were marked by the 'trivialization of the electoral competition, which deprived the elections of their meaning'.⁵ In 1999, Hevina Dashwood and Cranford Pratt argued that Tanzania and Zimbabwe had avoided many of the repressive features and internal violence plaguing other African states.⁶ Yet in 2000, Zimbabwe and

Tanzania experienced their most contested elections since independence. In Zimbabwe, the regime employed its supporters to harass and even murder opposition members; while opposition leaders were subjected to politically inspired treason charges. Zimbabwe's brutal and chaotic 'land reform' further suggests a turn to extremist politics. In Tanzania's 2000 general elections, peaceful protests against the CCM regime's electoral fraud on Zanzibar were met by mass repression the likes of which had not been seen since the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964. At least 70 people were killed and over 600 wounded. Thousands fled to the mainland and more than 2,000 Zanzibaris, mainly Pembans, sought asylum in Kenya.⁷ In neither country were these the first 'multi-party' elections. Zimbabwe has held multi-party elections since independence, albeit characterized by weak opposition parties; Tanzania had made a fairly smooth transition from the one-party state to a multi-party system in its 1995 election. Aside from the contested electoral processes, Zimbabwe and Tanzania experienced distinct demographic and regional voting patterns. The Zimbabwe vote polarized in two ways: between urban and rural voters generally, and between rural voters in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. In Tanzania, the vote was polarized mainly between Zanzibar and the mainland, though the mainland opposition parties initially made gains in urban areas and in certain rural constituencies. There was also an inter-island split in Zanzibar. Subsequent elections in both countries have failed to resolve these political fractures.

The variant of liberal democracy developed in these two African states during the 1990s has not led to democratic state building, market prosperity, or social justice, and in fact the reverse may be occurring. Observers have increasingly begun to analyse the failure of the radical nationalist regimes of Eastern and Southern Africa to complete their nation-building projects and find appropriate economic strategies and non-authoritarian formulas for their early quasi-socialist experiments.⁸ Popular explanations of Zimbabwe's crisis, though emphasizing President Mugabe's personalized approach to rule⁹, have failed to explain the emergence of this authoritarian tendency in 2000, or its link to the emergence of inter-party conflict. Others have emphasized the role of economic crisis in fomenting political crisis. Sandra Maclean suggests that racial tensions were 'undoubtedly exacerbated, if not directly caused' by the introduction of structural adjustment in the 1990s.¹⁰ Patrick Bond explicitly and consistently links neo-liberalism with the emergence of political violence in Zimbabwe; Sarah Bracking argues that Zimbabwe's economic liberalization programme spurred the regression into authoritarianism.¹¹ The demise of the national vision of the late Julius Nyerere is likewise mirrored in an increasingly authoritarian CCM regime, though that vision itself should perhaps be scrutinized. Recent analyses of Tanzania have emphasized the role of liberalization in creating new societal divisions. Jeanette Hartmann, Paul Kaiser, and Tim Kelsall stress the impact of economic structural adjustment and multiparty politics on Tanzania's previously homogenous social and political forces; John Campbell suggests that liberalization opened up hitherto latent pre-modern ethnic and religious identities while, more recently, Kaiser and Hellman's work addresses growing religious tensions between Christians and Muslims, though the role of the state in stoking religious identity politics is downplayed.¹² Further, Tanzania's long-held reputation as a regional 'island of stability' may not stand up if we examine the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Here a different picture emerges that bifurcated accounts of Tanzanian history have tended to submerge.¹³

In contrast to the above accounts we argue that economic liberalization is an insufficient explanatory factor. The political conflicts that emerged in 2000 in Zimbabwe and Tanzania have deep roots which evolved out of the perceived failure of the nationalist regimes to bring the benefits of independence equally to all regions and groups. While the decreasing allocative ability of both states clearly intensified competition for access to resources, the recent political violence should be interpreted as reflecting the unravelling of the post-independence coalition of forces that were formerly held in check by authoritarian politics and state expenditure. Though the nationalist movements failed to deliver the economic kingdom to their peoples, we cannot ignore their legacies. In Zimbabwe after 1980, and Tanzania after 1964, nationalist politics maintained a rough equilibrium among coalitions of disparate forces, incorporating varying degrees of coercion and consent. It was the collapse of these coalitions that triggered the struggles that recent elections in both countries have revealed. Drawing on our first-hand

experiences of ‘transitional democracy’ in Zimbabwe and Tanzania, we seek to deepen and advance earlier comparative work on their democratisation. The violence that has marked recent elections in Zimbabwe and Tanzania indicate high levels of dissension over issues of representation, control of the state apparatus, economic mismanagement, and identity formation. Through an extended but necessarily schematic account of their post-independence periods, this paper seeks to explain what democracy may reveal about conflict in contemporary Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

Unity and Developmentalism

Anti-Colonialism and Nationalism: Force against Fragmentation

Zimbabwe and Tanzania share a common British colonial legacy, as well as the experience of political violence. These violent legacies would deeply affect both post-independence polities. Zimbabwe suffered a protracted insurgency before the liberation fronts forced the strong settler-Rhodesian state to constitutionally accede to majority rule in 1979. Tanzania’s political violence was of a much shorter duration and geographically concentrated. The events known as the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964 created the African continent’s sole remaining union between two hitherto independent African states, now the United Republic of Tanzania, which, in contrast to neighbouring countries in eastern and central Africa, represents a proud tradition of national unity and peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence, anchored by the pan-national African language Swahili. ZANU-PF and CCM (The Tanganyika African National Union [TANU] before 1977) later forged inter-movement solidarity and inter-state cooperation, most notably when Zimbabwe received critical support (e.g. refugee camps and guerrilla training bases in Tanzania; the Organization of African Union’s Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa was based in Dar es Salaam) from Tanzania, a ‘Front Line State’, in the 1970s. These ties endured into the 1980s and 1990s when the Zimbabwean and Tanzania armies fought the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO), in aid of the Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Mozambique. Contemporary regional cooperation in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) also reflects the legacies of the ‘Thirty Years War’ which entwined South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. AK-47s, sickles, hoes, hammers, gold stars, revolutionary red backgrounds symbolizing sacrifice and a collective future, green backgrounds representing the fertility of the land, images of Greater Zimbabwe, and other symbols, adorn the national and party flags of these African countries. ‘Patriotic Front’ and ‘Revolutionary Party’ evoke transformational visions that are emblazoned onto the very names of ZANU-PF and the CCM. To paraphrase Lumumba-Kasongo, those nationalists who came to power through armed struggle in colonial Africa had a sense of history and defined their enemies more sharply than conservative nationalists: “They had some visions or ideals of the type of society to be built, and their leaders tended to be prophetic in their politics and deterministic in their policies. The history of society is defined as a permanent history of struggle.”¹⁴ The nascent inter-ethnic unity forged during the First *Chimurenga* (Shona, Liberation) and ‘*Maji Maji*’ (Swahili, ‘Water Water’), rural revolts against British and German colonialism in 1896 and 1905, brutally crushed, inform the contemporary worldviews of ZANU-PF and CCM.¹⁵

From 1899 until 1923, Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia) was ruled by the British South Africa Company under a royal charter until 1923 when it became a self-governing colony. The white minority resistance to political concessions to Africans culminated in the Rhodesia Front government’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, which Britain did nothing tangible to reverse. The war cost between 10,000 to 20,000 lives and led to the Lancaster House agreement of 1979, which crucially guaranteed the property rights of the white farmers for a decade. By the time of independence, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was dominant, but still had to contend with Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Ndabaningi Sithole’s ZANU faction, and Bishop Muzorewa’s (United) African National Congress. While the latter two ‘internal

parties' were discredited by their participation in the 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' government of 1978-79, ZAPU claimed the mantle of the armed struggle.¹⁶ Contributions to the historiography of Zimbabwe emphasise the different experiences of nationalism, depending on age, gender, status and locality.¹⁷ Zimbabwean nationalist politics emerged out of trades union politics but also incorporated elites, often missionary-driven and inter-racially organized.¹⁸ During the liberation struggle ZANU-PF was mainly active in eastern and central Zimbabwe, known as Mashonaland, and inhabited by the numerically dominant Shona ethnic group, while ZAPU operated in the Ndebele-speaking regions. Norma Kriger's case study of Mutoka in Mashonaland reveals that the guerrilla army was able to operate without mass peasant support.¹⁹ ZANU-PF itself was also factionalized; divisions manifested themselves in violent personalized and ideological struggles for control of the party, including the quashing of the left-wing unity Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) by the ZANU-PF bureaucracy in 1977.²⁰ ZANU-PF/ZAPU hostility marked both the years of the liberation struggle and the years between 1980-87. In the 1980 liberation election, Mugabe's ZANU-PF won a majority of the seats, with ZAPU confined to its strongholds of Matabeleland and the Midlands. The Mugabe cabinet included ZAPU leaders, but this alliance did not last as conflict between the ex-fighters spread within the newly-integrated army. What began as mismanaged post-war demobilization degenerated into a counter-insurgency campaign waged by the state's security apparatus, the North Korean-trained and Shona-dominated 5th Brigade, against dissidents, and Nkomo's ZAPU's support base more generally. Disappearances, detention, and killings, perhaps numbering 20,000, afflicted Matabeleland in these early years, known in Shona as the *gukurahundi* (a horribly euphemistic metaphor meaning, 'the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rain'). The government's rhetoric, redolent of unity as both a historical good and as necessary for future development, sought to discredit ZAPU as a treasonous Ndebele party.²¹

Tanganyika became a British mandated territory under the League of Nations after Germany's defeat in World War 1. On 9 December 1961 Tanganyika became independent under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius Nyerere. Tanzanian nationalism on the mainland was not divided between strong competing parties, but neither was it a simple or unifying experience. Susan Geiger's study of women in TANU provides a paradigmatic case of how 'metanarratives' of nationalism concealed divisions and complexities.²² Situated just off of the coast of Tanzania contemporary Zanzibar comprises approximately one million inhabitants and two primary islands, Unguja and Pemba. Prior to the 19th century Zanzibar was dominated by Arab colonizers, dealing in ivory and slaves (its last vestiges being abolished in 1897), before becoming a British protectorate in 1890. Decolonization witnessed deep divisions within Zanzibar's nationalist movement. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) led by Ali Mushin and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) of Mohammed Shamte represented the former Arab association as well as many Arab landowners, peasants, shopkeepers and civil servants, especially on Pemba Island. The ZNP/ZPPP coalition confronted the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) under Abeid Karume and its ally the *Umma* (the Masses) Party led by Adulrahman Babu, a leftist breakaway faction of the ZNP; their strongholds were on the island of Unguja and comprised many Christian mainlanders, dockworkers, and the indigenous peasantry.²³ The ZNP/ZPPP coalition won the 1963 independence election and functioned as a government for three months before being obliterated by the events known as the Zanzibar Revolution of 12 January 1964, a murky and bloody affair that propelled the ASP to state power on the backs of 10,000 dead out of a population approximating 300,000 at the time.²⁴ Deportation, detention, and public flogging befell many of Arabic descent and ZNP/ZPPP indigenous supporters alike. As with the *gukurahundi*, '*ukombozi*' (Swahili, 'liberation') was one-sided and in no way can be characterized as a 'civil war' or coined a 'proletarian revolution.'²⁵ With right-wing Zanzibari nationalism apparently despatched, Karume's ASP rapidly moved against the *Umma* Party, and with CIA support, just three months later, agreed to the Articles of Union with Nyerere's Tanganyika. In April 1964, the Republic of Tanganyika and the People's Republic of Zanzibar merged to form what became known as the United Republic of Tanzania. The events of 1964 left half of Zanzibar's population disenfranchised. Compared to the mainland, Zanzibar did not gain the benefits of the TANU one-party system idealized by Pratt.²⁶ Instead, Zanzibaris were ruled by an appointed president and the Zanzibar

Revolutionary Council. It was not until 1980 that elections on the Isles were held for the Zanzibar Presidency. Only in 1979 and 1984 did constitutional reforms provide Zanzibar its own legislature, the partly-elected House of Representatives.²⁷ There was to be no Tanzanian equivalent of a Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (1997) as in the case of the Matabeleland massacres, let alone an official apology and compensation for lives and property lost. In virtually all political quarters of the time only silence greeted the gross abuses committed in Matabeleland and Zanzibar.

At independence the nationalist regimes that took power faced certain familiar problems: neither the nation nor the nationalist movements were integrated or stable. The two dissimilar leaders, Mugabe and Nyerere, practiced similar tactics of elite cooptation and social demobilization in attempting to build ruling coalitions from these unstable foundations. Although Zimbabwe and Tanzania's experiences of decolonization were markedly different, the nationalist politics that emerged after independence do bear similarities. Both ZANU-PF and TANU (later CCM) are best considered 'partis unific', and as Zolberg noted about not dissimilar West African parties, 'the processes of co-option, negotiation, and reconciliation [were] never fully superseded.'²⁸ Both regimes emphasized the necessity of 'unity and stability' against both internal and external enemies, which meant delegitimizing democratic struggles perceived as undermining national unity. This emphasis on Zimbabwean national unity is retained throughout the decades after independence, predicated in the 1980s on fears of destabilization by apartheid South Africa. Tanzania experienced a not-dissimilar campaign against the instability of neighbouring countries, especially against Idi Amin's Uganda during the 1978-79 war. Not only were ZANU-PF and TANU essentially coalitions at the time of independence, they further expanded outwards, subsuming power centres in society and polity.

Mugabe's regime was able to capitalize ideologically on its successes in the liberation war and substantial victory in the independence elections to build a network of alliances with his former supporters and enemies. This coalition was broader than the one that had fought the liberation war – incorporating white farmers, former Rhodesian politicians holding key ministerial posts, businessmen, and western donor agencies. Described as a policy of reconciliation – heavily influenced by Mozambican President Samora Machel's advice to Mugabe not to drive the skilled white community into exile – the demands of these groups were carefully balanced against those of the historic nationalist coalition, which was demobilized or selectively integrated into the state apparatus.²⁹ Although ZANU-PF never fully pursued its goal of a de jure one-party state, ZANU-PF's leaders perceived it as such: 'We are one state, with one society and one nation, one party, and one leader'.³⁰ The 'incorporation' of ZAPU's leadership in ZANU-PF in 1987 marked the culmination of this trend. Despite this, the long rivalry between ZANU-PF and ZAPU made the merger grudging. Mugabe saw ZAPU as a constant threat. His attempts to sideline ZAPU in the early eighties had '...far reaching implications for certain newly-emergent yet basic political realities: for nation-building, for state-made ethnic polarisation, [and] for the concentration of power within the state.'³¹

Tanzania is often described as an African state that transcended the ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions inherent in colonial boundaries and state formation, although such descriptions tend to ignore Zanzibar. This success is generally attributed to Nyerere's personal contribution to policy-making. Paul Kaiser emphasizes that the 'politically divisive array of social groups achieved a degree of cohesion that surpassed each and every neighbouring country.'³² Or, as Jeanette Hartmann argues, Nyerere's nation-building strategies meant that, 'Nyerere had to create the state, consolidate it, and institutionalise it, so that it would give him the tools to develop a political community with a common political culture within a new state formation.'³³ The 'Africanisation' of the civil service was in practice 'Tanu-ization' as party members were moved directly into the administration. Cliffe's analysis of Tanzania emphasizes the 'neutralisation and absorption of political parties' as well as broader 'associational integration' including unions, the civil service and the military.³⁴ Similarly Kelsall notes the systematic incorporation of local forms: party branches (1954), labour unions (1962-1964), co-operatives, youth and parents organizations (1964-1965), the establishment of a single party system (1965), the abolition of district councils (1972), and decentralization measures to streamline centre-local command structures (1972).³⁵

In 1977, TANU merged with the ASP to create CCM, an all-union party.³⁶ Former ASP politicians held significant posts in Nyerere's government. Ex-members of the defunct ZNP and ZPPP also joined the ASP.³⁷ Eventually the Union itself would become a source of growing tension as the new party contained within it the seething contradictions left over from 1964. For many Zanzibaris there was both tension and ambivalence regarding the creation of the CCM in 1977. Many expected Union institutions to curb ASP excesses (revealing a then-current faith in Julius Nyerere's moderation), yet came to fear that CCM Dodoma (the capital of the United Republic) would gradually erode Zanzibar's autonomy especially in the wake of the 1977 constitutional reforms, which added additional powers to the Union.³⁸ Ironically, by the 1990s, many had come to see the autocrat and Union co-founder, Karume, as a staunch defender of Zanzibar's autonomy against Julius Nyerere.

'Socialism' and the Great Reversal

Ideological claims derived from the nationalist struggle were both refracted and reinforced through the discourse of state-led development. The state apparatus propagated the ruling party's ideology, provided it with the means for the exercise of coercion, and gave it the material resources to distribute to society. Yet, as we have seen, these coalitions and alliances were built on fractured bases. The nationalist fronts' political projects presupposed strong authoritarian states to hold these centrifugal forces together while delivering economic growth and satisfying mass needs. In the wake of the party mergers and the apparent victories of national unity over regionalism, the path seemed clear for full-fledged socialist transitions. The nationalist fronts initially did make advances in the social sector. These years of restoration, hope, and public purpose were to prove a chimera, however, as concrete results vanished and evidence of corruption mounted. The foundation of these attempted transitions rested in the rural areas. The Zimbabwean countryside would experience less intervention than in a rural Tanzania. Crucially Tanzania's social and economic base is more rural than Zimbabwe's. Though the percentage of population residing in the rural areas is almost identical, 65% for Zimbabwe and 64% for Tanzania, agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2004 stood at 14.2% for Zimbabwe and 42.3% for Tanzania.³⁹ Zimbabwe's more urban-based economy, and hence greater organizational diversity, would mean greater challenges for ZANU-PF's hold on power compared to Tanzania where CCM's corporatist structures had a bind over the formal institutions of the peasantry.

The policy document 'Growth with Equity' framed ZANU-PF's socialist development strategy (1980-86), but was from the beginning ensnarled in contradictions based as it was on a viable capitalist model catalysing the building of an ill-defined socialism (revolutionary or welfarist).⁴⁰ Nevertheless these redistributionist policies initially made gains, especially through the provisioning of schools and health clinics. In agrarian Zimbabwe's communal areas producer prices remained high in the 1980s, while the extension of agricultural services to the peasantry enabled substantial production booms in maize and cotton. Despite these enormous advances in rural development, 30-40% of peasants still did not produce enough even for their own consumption – due to lack of access to land, draft power, credit, and labour. Land re-distribution also failed to achieve policy objectives. The original plan was to settle 162,000 families by 1985, but by 1989 only 52,000 were settled on 3 million hectares based on different settlement models; and the programme was further scaled down even after the expiration of the Lancaster House restrictions in 1990.⁴¹ The autonomous producer co-operatives under the Organization of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), which comprised 25,000 members in the 1980s, many being ex-combatants, suggested a fledgling social movement, a perception certainly held by the OCCZIM leadership. Yet government practice was ambiguous at best (even supportive ZANU-PF cadres viewed co-operatives bureaucratically), and state credit totally inadequate.⁴² The disillusionment in the OCCZIM grassroots could perhaps be best summed up by members of an affiliated multi-purpose collective co-operative who around this time referred to the ZANU-PF elite as 'those bourgeoisie'.⁴³ Zimbabwe's unions, churches, NGOs and co-operatives were not explicitly part of either the party or the state, yet personal connections and the rhetoric of unity was used to link them into the state's developmentalist

agenda in the 1980s.⁴⁴ Dorman argues that ‘the interests of the party-state [were] equated with development’ in a pattern that justified authoritarian practices, while John Makumbe notes that the ‘winner’ of local government reform was ‘the ruling ZANU-PF party, central government...and selected or favoured regions in the country’; similarly Alexander describes the rural party structures of ZANU-PF as having been ‘demobilized.’⁴⁵

These above trends signified the decline of elite commitment to the popular sector. At the same time, low real investment growth, growing numbers of educated unemployed, and stagnant exports put further pressure on the state interventionist model such that there emerged a strong degree of domestic support for reform, known as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), launched in 1991.⁴⁶ ESAP’s impact on the national economy was generally negative. The economy contracted by 10% and the Zimbabwe dollar fell in value, while health and education witnessed declines in real current expenditures over 1990-1992 of 11.8% and 8%, respectively.⁴⁷ In 1992 inflation, compounded by drought, stood at 42%. For the Zimbabwean working class ESAP was disastrous as the percentage of poor came to comprise the vast majority of the populace. Health costs increased by 60%, state subsidies on basic foodstuffs were reduced, the minimum wage was dropped, and employment protection weakened, while the government retrenched an estimated 17-25,000 Zimbabweans.⁴⁸ Female-headed households faced ever growing competition in informal markets while coping with increasing malnutrition.⁴⁹ ESAP side-glanced the bloated Cabinet and bureaucracy,⁵⁰ a reality observed by many Harare residents who referred to Mugabe’s police-escorted motorcade as ‘Bob Mugabe and the Wailers’. The movie ‘Flame’ (directed by Ingrid Sinclair, 1996), which traced the life of a female guerrilla and her post-war demobilization, caught the mood of the time as ZANU-PF apparatchiks, members of bodies with Soviet-style nomenclature like Politburo, Central Committee etc., parachuted into various commercial farms, privatised companies, and palatial homes to become *nouveau riche*.

Anthony Clayton suggests that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 may have been an attempt by Julius Nyerere to steer a middle course between radicals and non-radicals inside of TANU.⁵¹ Nationalization of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy was followed by coercive villagization in the 1970s. Infused by a Manichean ontology that viewed even intra-party criticism as ‘traitorous’, the TANU/CCM state would brook no autonomous village governance in its quest for control of the countryside, as starkly revealed by the dismantling of the Ruvuma Development Association.⁵² Issa Shivji’s brilliantly captures how *Ujamaa* (Swahili, family-hood; African Socialism) functioned as a hegemonic developmental ideology in Tanzania until liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s ‘undercut the material basis on which the hegemony of *Ujamaa* was predicated...[until]...little was left of *Ujamaa* except the rhetoric. . .’⁵³ As economic weakness and structural adjustment limited development activities, and development itself became more of an illusion, it became more important rhetorically. On Zanzibar, ‘the call for *maendeleo* (Swahili, development) increased inversely with the lack thereof, and in fact became shrill in its pitch in the last years of mono-party rule.’ . . . ‘the message from the centre explicitly urged that “politics” was best dealt with by the party leadership; “economics” was the concern of the masses who through their hard work would bring development.’⁵⁴ Shivji states: ‘the real contents of politics – addressing [the] differences in the society as a whole – is at best cast in developmental terms, or at worst, castigated as divisive, against national unity.’⁵⁵ In Zanzibar, we see the disempowerment of the party cadres where ‘the lower organs were merely transmission belts for orders from the Centre and where the rural party structures had ossified’.⁵⁶ Karume’s anti-peasant policies in the 1960s and 1970s – especially around clove pricing - deepened anti-ASP sentiment. In the food crop sector, rice collectivization campaigns, bereft of significant organizational and material support, contributed to a famine that drove many Zanzibaris to the mainland, and forced others to rely on roots and bush fruit, while others are alleged to have starved to death.⁵⁷ During the Zanzibar independence anniversary cited in the introduction, and with his recent land reform in mind, Mugabe had extolled the benefits of the Karume land reforms of 1965 for the ‘indigenous’ people. While the ASP land reform did benefit the many landless squatters who received three acre plots, the redistributed land could not be rented out or sold.⁵⁸ Note too, that in contradistinction to ASP historiography many of the indigenous peasantry of the

Islamic faith considered the confiscated plantation land to be *haramu* (Swahili, prohibited). Many large land holdings were also left intact, and some ASP leaders appeared to have received more than their fair share, an allegation now levelled at ZANU-PF leaders.⁵⁹

Tanzania's rolling back of the state intensified after Julius Nyerere succumbed to the dictates of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1985. Nyerere's successor, the Zanzibari Ali Hassan Mwinyi, subsequently embarked on an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1986. Mwinyi's nickname, Mzee '*Ruksa*' (Swahili, 'Permission'), reflected an acceleration of corruption in public life and the abandonment of comprehensive development planning. Parastatal privatization, one of the pillars of Tanzanian socialism, signified a decisive shift away from an inclusive nationalism.⁶⁰ The urban areas were hit hard., The consumer price index for food, which stood at 386.3 in 1984, climbed to 2,475 in 1991.⁶¹ In agriculture, Tanzania's ERP aimed to raise producer prices in real terms yet, with some exceptions, the impact on smallholder production was nugatory as the hikes were absorbed by government marketing boards.⁶² Foreign investors and regime personnel began to alienate land for capitalist farms, conservation schemes, tourist promotion and, more recently, bio-fuel agriculture, often at the expense of extremely vulnerable pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities. Similar processes can be observed with the establishment of conservation projects in Zimbabwe where land became more lucrative for white farmers and/or burgeoning businessmen-cum-apparatchiks from the ZANU-PF elite.⁶³ Similarly, land titling programmes which are ostensibly about making land tenure more productive over 'inefficient' communal forms in reality has shown that land registration fees and administrative processes are often beyond the means of the rural poor.⁶⁴ Liberalization also exposed peasant smallholders and primary co-operatives alike to predatory private middleman (e.g. removal of input subsidies).⁶⁵ The Zanzibar government's import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy of the 1960s and 1970s became discredited by the 1980s and saw trade barriers reduced, parastatals privatized, and economic free zones openly encouraged.⁶⁶ Deteriorating social services, coupled with the removal of subsidies on imported staple foodstuffs like rice and sugar, further deepened the hardships faced by the majority of Zanzibaris. Per capita income dropped from US\$ 269 in 1976 to US\$ 18.8 in 1987.⁶⁷ The boom-bust nature of clove harvests, an exploitive clove monopsony, stagnant agricultural smallholder systems, a marginalized co-operative sector, and food import dependency, all hallmarks of the colonial era, beset both the *dirigist* and free market models of the mono-party system.

The ZANU-PF and CCM governments did not even bother with ideological semantics by rationalizing liberal economic reforms as being building blocks for socialist reconstruction; rather, by and large, a market myopia permeated public discourse. ZANU-PF had ossified, having failed to build in mechanisms of renewal. At a meeting of the central committee in September 1990 (where the party formally rejected its commitment to a one party system) Mugabe, decrying ZANU-PF's shambolic state, urged it be revitalized from the grassroots up, similar to Nyerere exclaiming around the same time that CCM 'stunk'. Observers cite the 'mechanistic, but largely unserious advocacy of Marxism-Leninism – and a lack of resources and power in the formal representative organizations of the popular groups, a consequence of class weakness and the ESAP-Marxist-Leninist disconnect, formalized in 1991 when Mugabe stopped referring to Marxist-Leninism on independence day.⁶⁸ Within CCM there was a growing divide between a relatively cohesive politico-bureaucratic class driving party policy and an increasingly alienated rank-and-file, many of whom held fast to some vision of a folk *Ujamaa*. By 1990, the year of the last mono-party election, CCM mentioned *Ujamaa* but twice.⁶⁹ The CCM national leadership subsequently conducted an auto-privatization with its 1991 Zanzibar Declaration, which nullified the Arusha Declaration and symbolized the triumph of pro-market party elements over leftist ideologues.⁷⁰ CCM leaders were no longer bound by the Leadership Code of 1967 which had formally forbidden capitalistic practices and moonlighting.⁷¹ John Saul's earlier work on fraction and the relative autonomy of radical state projects had sought to strike a balance between class reductionism that reduced the petty bourgeoisie to either its commercial or bureaucratic wings, or to conventional political science that ignored the material underpinnings of 'ethnic' politics.⁷² In light of post-socialist outcomes contemporary observers have noted the convergence between the commercial and bureaucratic African elites in both

countries. Bracking argues that ESAP (1991-1996) witnessed the growth of party-state capitalists whose interests came to conflict with pre-existing capitalists (i.e. whites) in a context of relative de-industrialization.⁷³ Gibbon, writing on Tanzania's reform process of the 1980s, argues that a state bourgeoisie, allied to well-connected private business, accumulated colossal sums of capital at the interfaces of the state and external private and public capital.⁷⁴ In both cases these tendencies can be seen in the nature of intra-party conflict which, when it did rear itself, primarily reflected personality and/or regional schisms rather than ideological ones.⁷⁵ Whether ZIPA, *Umma*, and other socialist groupings, could have charted more auto-centric and/or democratic intra-party directions in the Cold War era is highly unlikely given the prevailing orthodoxies of the time. Consigned to universities, ideological colleges, development institutes, mass organizations, party secretariats, and newspaper editorials, radical socialists would expound ever de-territorialized doctrines as '1989' loomed.⁷⁶

'Liberation' and Liberal Democracy

The Emergence of Democracy Movements and Regime Reconstitution

As the section above suggests, the loss of material resources for allocation are at the heart of the crises in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. But in contrast to those accounts that imply that structural adjustment caused the crises, we emphasize that the economic weakness of the state caused the breakdown of the coalitions created in the years following independence. The collapse of the Eastern bloc regimes caught both ZANU-PF and CCM off guard. Richard Saunder's vignette of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation's (ZBC) prevaricating as to whether the late Cececeau was a 'comrade' or a 'deposed dictator' almost mirrors the Tanzanian *Daily News*' reporting of a returning CCM delegation hailing Cececeau's socialist successes, shortly before his execution.⁷⁷ Unlike the Leninist vanguard regimes of Eastern Europe, however, the ZANU-PF and CCM mass-party regimes would not only contain mobilized constituencies but dominate their political transitions against centre-right opposition parties. ZANU-PF and CCM sought to re-group their political coalitions through fusing ethnicity – a traditional ploy of conservative regimes like in Kenya or Malawi – with a revived and exclusivist national liberation narrative that interlocked communitarian categories with national sovereignty. Lumumba-Kasongo, while acknowledging the salience of ethnicity and nationalism as containing their own internal value systems, critically draws attention to the ways in which ethnic manipulation and petty-bourgeois nationalism synergize with state [de]formation, power consolidation, democracy movements, geopolitics, and anarchic global competition. His definition of nationalism as a system of beliefs that puts a certain group of people together, and an ideology that promotes an emotional feeling of belonging to a cohesive social group based on common characteristics including language, religion, and geography, speaks to the ways in which the post-Cold War state itself, whether Marxist or African socialist, redefines what constitute common national characteristics.⁷⁸ Crucially, despite the legacies of ZANU-PF and CCM, these regimes retained significant mass support due in good part to the nature of the imported Western model which many citizens saw as a threat to the nation. Abrahamson's argument that the impetus for liberal democracy in Africa did not derive just from the internal protest, but also international pressure for it, is reinforced by Robinson's contention that contemporary US democracy promotion targets 'civil society' in intervened countries (e.g. political parties, trade unions, media) in order to integrate them into a corporate-dominated transnational social order.⁷⁹ These authors use the term 'polyarchy' to characterize a model primarily centred on free markets and representative democracy minus the significant social and economic rights that might arise out of popular democratic pressures. For those peripheral countries opting for modern state structures, 'the commanding vision for organizing, the procedural and substantive aspects of democratic governance is associated with a Western liberal, capitalist democratic conception of the polity based on the politico-economic and military power of the West.'⁸⁰ This model empowered hitherto marginalized groups and regions, releasing political forces which, when funnelled up to the ideological level, transformed politics into a violent zero-sum game of irreconcilable worldviews that made rational

policy debate difficult. Zimbabwe and Tanzania's transitional 'third wave' reform fractures warns against perspectives that inadequately explain the wider historical and structural factors framing elite behaviour, as well as society-centric explanations that imply democracy is 'unsuited' for Africa.⁸¹

Dorman and Kriger document electoral manipulation and violence going back to Zimbabwe's 1980 independence election, ranging from boundary redrawing, gerrymandering, and the transportation of ballot boxes by security personnel to violent anti-imperialist rhetoric and civil service purges.⁸² These practices would intensify with the dramatic rise of a broad-based national opposition party in Zimbabwe; and in the case of Tanzania, begin in earnest from the 1995 general election onwards. The one-party state in Zimbabwe was only *de facto*, never *de jure*, and for this reason, the transition to multi-party elections in the 1990s was an ambiguous process. Following the Unity Accord in 1987, ZANU-PF moved towards realizing its long-term goal of creating a one party state.⁸³ Legislative amendments in the 1990s attempted to strengthen state control over university staff, students, NGOs, and unions. ZANU-PF's domination began to fray in the wake of major corruption scandals (e.g. Willowgate, the looting of the war vets fund). The demise of Apartheid South Africa further undermined the rationale for a state of emergency. Isolated political alternatives emerged. By the late 1980s the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) escaped the corporatist clutches of the state.⁸⁴ In 1988 Morgan Tsvangirai, a former ZANU-PF commissar, was elected ZCTU Secretary General, and in 1990 the ZCTU backed multiparty democracy.⁸⁵ By the late 1990s the regime's commitment to the ideology of development began to be publicly questioned. Labour unrest became common, with waves of strikes and stay-aways throughout the crisis-racked economy.⁸⁶ The private media expanded greatly after 1997; and from 1998 onwards, NGOs, churches and trade unions publicly demanded involvement in policy-making.⁸⁷ These pressures, combined, created a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which emerged out of the labour movement and an NGO coalition for constitutional reform, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). Support subsequently developed among students and youth. Significantly the MDC was able to cross-cut urban (especially working class) and rural Matabeleland and, as such, it was the first party since independence to mount a nation-wide challenge to ZANU-PF.

Tanzania's transition to multipartyism, skilfully and peacefully overseen by CCM, witnessed specific regional differences to the political transitions. Appointed in 1991 to gauge the Tanzanian citizenry's views on whether abandon the single party system for a multiparty system, the Nyalali Commission toured Tanzania's regions where the 'actually-existing' CCM was lukewarmly endorsed. The introduction of multiparty democracy on the mainland preceded the existence of autonomous and organized opposition power centres in town and countryside. As such, the mainland opposition parties were badly divided and urban-based. Tanzania mainland's 1995 elections did not witness serious political conflict, though key regions bucked the pro-CCM trend. The two anti-CCM power centres were in Arusha among the Maasai and in Moshi among the Chagga ethnic groups who threw their support behind the major mainland-based opposition party at the time, the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR) – *Mageuzi*.⁸⁸ An MDC-equivalent in the Tanzanian trade unions never emerged. Theoretically empowered by the 1971 TANU Guidelines, workplace control was never actually effected. Subsequent industrial decline, IMF pressures and institutional reforms further politically sidelined the Tanzanian trade unions during the multiparty transition, with thousands retrenched in industries and the civil service.⁸⁹ On the Isles, especially Pemba, a hot reception awaited the Nyalali Commission. One participant maintained that the 1964 Union was a merger between two sovereign and equal states, irrespective of geographical size; another citizen said that what alienated Pembans was the lack of social amenities and the way the government sacked civil servants who did not register for the 1990 single party general elections, adding that electricity and water were only available when national leaders visited Pemba, 'It is this double standard that has eroded the Government's popularity in the island'.⁹⁰ Regional alienation was further sharpened when the Chief Minister of the time, Seif Shariff Hamad, a Pembani, who had been slated for the Zanzibar Presidency (when Zanzibari President Ali Hassan Mwinyi became Union president in 1985), got sidelined by yet another Ungujan, Idris Wakil. Then in May 1988 Hamad was dismissed as Chief Minister, expelled from the party, and detained on trumped up charges.⁹¹ The

emergence of the formal opposition in Zanzibar had been preceded by passive and overt resistance to the CCM regime for at least a decade: great swathes of society was an opposition in waiting and multiparty politics provided the institutional mechanism to remove CCM from the Isles, forever. Formed in 1992, The Civic United Front (CUF), like other Tanzanian opposition parties, drew members from both the mainland and the Isles. On the Isles, CUF represented a broad alliance of urban intellectuals and business interests, the vast majority of Pemba island, Zanzibar Stone Town, along with some key rural Unguja constituencies bordering Zanzibar Town. Seif Shariff Hamad, upon his release from jail, became Secretary General of the CUF.

Like other African countries in the 1990s Zimbabwe and Tanzania have been beset by debates about citizenship rights. ZANU-PF and CCM began to construe imagined borderlines of who was in/out of a rapidly reconstituting nation. By February 1999, Zimbabwean Minister Sidney Sekeramayi alleged that 'some foreign governments are forming an informal coalition with the press to try and remove the Zimbabwean government from power.'⁹² Later the same month, Mugabe stated that the actions of some groups might force the party to 'revisit' the policy of reconciliation.⁹³ ZANU-PF viewed the MDC as a brainchild of Britain and the Commercial Farmers Union given that the NCA and MDC were established in the wake of compulsory land acquisition notices, as well as being recipients of Western NGO and bilateral funding.⁹⁴ The MDC's political discourse was 'post-nationalist'; it did not blame everything wrong on colonialism and the West. Morgan Tsvangarai called ZANU-PF's nationalism top down, centralized, and in a time-warp.⁹⁵ Yet the MDC's 1999 right shift away from a social democratic/trade unionist platform would expose it to ZANU-PF calumnies. ZANU-PF saw the growing involvement of whites as breaking the unspoken contract not to get involved in politics and therefore the continuation of the war by other means. The MDC's advocacy of a 'market land process' also fed into ZANU-PF's 'Third *Chimurenga*' agenda which sought once and for all settle the problem of settler agriculture. The fast-track land reform, the Zimbabwean army's accessing of minerals worth over \$200 million in the Congo, the one-off payments to the war vets (totally Z\$ 4.5 billion), may all be interpreted as the party centre seeking to bolster its core liberation coalition.⁹⁶ Conversely, the removal of white settlers and foreign agricultural labourers, and Operation '*Murambatsvina*' (Shona, 'Restore Order'), an urban trawling process that rustified thousands of MDC urban (non)supporters alike, were all massive efforts at spatially scattering the MDC coalition. During this period, rural Mashonaland remained a ZANU-PF stronghold. Sithole maintains that MDC only narrowly lost to ZANU-PF in these areas because the rural populace were vulnerable to terror campaigns and food aid bribery, a stance countered with greater plausibility by Bracking who, cautioning against Euro-centrism, argues that ZANU-PF did resonate with rural voters ideologically around gender, development, and the MDC's pro-Western orientation.⁹⁷

While pre-revolutionary social groupings are present in both opposition parties, it remains the case that to characterize the MDC and the CUF as 'counter-revolutionary' and in cahoots with the British Prime Minister and the Omani Sultanate is a gross distortion of their own mass followings, and ironic given earlier touring by ZANU-PF and CCM leaders to these 'heartlands of neo-colonialism.' The MDC and CUF are better understood as 'United Fronts' representing primarily indigenous forces struggling over unresolved historical issues and post-independence (mal)governance. Matabeleland and Zanzibar reveal the counter-nationalisms that challenge state-generated nationalism and its communitarian labelling. The role of violence is also significant for the oppositions know that these regimes, with blood already on their hands, are willing to spill more. Finally these two regions pose challenges to those who dismiss the resistances there as forms of 'sub-nationalisms' that serve to 'fragment' the hallowed unity of the African state.⁹⁸ In Matabeleland, ZANU-PF, relying on para-party organs, conceptualised the countryside as the 'moral heart of the nation.'⁹⁹ ZANU-PF claimed that the MDC was a neo-colonial 'front' for the interests of white farmers and 'Rhodesian' and British interests, with an agenda to reverse the gains of independence. Despite these charges, the MDC was effective in Matabeleland due to strong urban-rural links, and because the 'white farmer' issue was less salient there. The absence of an apology or compensation from the Mugabe regime for the Matabeleland atrocities, further alienated voters from ZANU-PF. The MDC spread into the rural areas through NGOs, churches, and the ZCTU district

councils. During election rallies the MDC was cast as the successor to the ZAPU nationalist tradition. And with the MDC victory in the June 2000 parliamentary elections in Matabeleland, the opposition began to label ZANU-PF as a 'Shona peasant party', while Mugabe characterized the MDC victory as 'tribal' and threatened another *gukurahundi*.

On Zanzibar, the peasantry on the compact Isles, where the state was proximate compared to their mainland counterparts, were extremely politicised members of both parties. In 1995 pro-CUF villagers would remark that, 'people in rural *Bara* (Swahili, the mainland) still think Julius Nyerere is President.' Like MDC, CUF's language was one of human rights, constitutional reform (including a federal vision for a reformed Union, a policy position also shared by other mainland opposition parties), and a broadsided critique of the economy. Also similar to MDC, CUF's stance on land ownership (e.g. the Karume land reforms) has been less than clear. Yet at the same time many oppositionists stressed CCM's betrayal of the 1964 Revolution for their failing to improve the lives of ordinary Zanzibaris. For CUF supporters there was fear of violence, the dead and disappeared of the Karume era, and the 'golden age' of pre-revolutionary Zanzibar. Further supporters of CCM Zanzibar demonstrated an astounding ignorance of Pemba's economic exploitation by the government clove monopsony.¹⁰⁰ On Pemba itself, community resentment against declining living standards, often led by school teachers, had eroded the confidence of many islanders in CCM, even in traditional ASP strongholds. At a campaign rally in south Pemba a CUF Zanzibar House of Representatives candidate courageously exclaimed that were CCM to 'overthrow' an elected CUF government, God would judge them to be killers; he then proceeded to introduce other opposition candidates gesticulating towards their Bantu-features and exclaiming, 'here are your Arabs!'.¹⁰¹ CCM on the other hand saw CUF as a challenge to both the Union and the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution.¹⁰² The large Union army presence on the Isles further buttressed the power of CCM Zanzibar. Warnings were sounded that mainland-based Zanzibaris would be repatriated to the Isles were the Union to be broken, a statement similar to the musings of ZANU-PF personnel that Zimbabwe would be better off with just the 6 million people who had supported the liberation struggle, out of its 13 million.¹⁰³ CCM's threats against Seif Shariff Hamad seeking to occupy Zanzibar State House were also similar to pronouncements by leading Zimbabwean security service personnel that they would never recognize Morgan Tsangarai because he had never served in the liberation fronts.¹⁰⁴ CCM Zanzibar supporters pointed to the achievement of peace and stability, and the elimination of exploitation and racial oppression. By late 1992, there was a discernible shift in CCM Zanzibar's tactics away from campaigning in rural co-operatives, among other sites, and into the *maskan*, a kind of community political café of male party faithful, and a nearby reminder of CCM's 'other face'. CCM Zanzibar also kept tighter control of independent media and civil society on the Isles compared to the mainland. In the warmed up 'revolutionary' discourse of the multiparty period many regime supporters considered Pembans to be 'country bumpkins' and Arab fellow-travellers unfit to govern.¹⁰⁵ During Zanzibar's first multiparty by-election at Kwahani, Unguja in 1993, CCM employed the carnivalesque campaign technique of dressing a man as a manumission-era slave.¹⁰⁶ This, despite the fact that the population is racially mixed with few Zanzibaris of direct Arab descent. Like Mugabe's racial attacks on whites, such visceral evocations were the oxygen of political polarization.

'Hemmed in' Between Polyarchy and Exhausted Nationalism

The Mugabe regime was more vulnerable to Western pressure compared to its liberationist ally, the CCM. ZANU-PF, with its fragile intra-party succession process, faces a comparatively more powerful urban civil society, along with regional opposition centred on Matabeleland. This array of opposition necessitated the ZANU-PF regime's moving against the white farms in order to boost its traditional support base. Griffin rightly observes that old-style confiscatory land reform in the current global climate would trigger a capital strike by Western bi/multilateral institutions.¹⁰⁷ The USA and the European Union

slapped travel sanctions on the ZANU-PF leadership and froze its overseas assets in the wake of Zimbabwe's controversial 2002 elections, though there are no bi-lateral trade sanctions. And in the time-honoured language of Tom Paine the US State Department labelled the Zimbabwean government an 'outpost of tyranny', slightly softer language than its earlier epithet of 'terrorist' when the US was strategically allied to the white settler regimes.¹⁰⁸ The ZANU-PF regime sought energy sources, aid and investment from, among others, Equatorial Guinea (post-'Wonga Coup')¹⁰⁹ and China ('Look East' policy). In contradistinction, commentators ranging from the revolutionary left to business analysts remark on the close relationship between the CCM government and Western governments.¹¹⁰ From being feted at Davos, the 'G8' and the Commission for Africa, to positive media exposure, debt relief, muted human rights criticism, and even a coveted visit by the US President, the CCM government remains firmly in power. A perusal of World Bank country policy and institutional assessment ratings shows bottom-ranked Zimbabwe being 'outperformed' by Tanzania in almost every category.¹¹¹ As a primary recipient of international aid in sub-Saharan Africa the Tanzanian government is able to maintain gross capital formation, finance the imports of goods and services, and bolster the lion's share of central government expenditure. Foreign direct investment is significantly greater in Tanzania, at USD 478m compared to Zimbabwe at USD 9m, for 2004.¹¹² Nonetheless both countries remained mired in external debt, though Tanzania's has declined from around USD 8b in 2006 to 5b in 2008, due to multilateral debt relief arrangements, while Zimbabwe's external debt is approaching USD 5 billion with no debt relief in sight. Both countries continue to suffer chronic balance of payment deficits. With the demise of economic nationalism, Tanzania's economy is increasingly controlled by foreigners, especially in the mining sector, banking, large and tourism, the sustainability of which is questionable.¹¹³

Western political support is crucial to each regime's durability. One has only to contrast the tepid response of the Commonwealth to the collapse of its brokered 1999 agreement in Tanzania, the first CCM-CUF Accord, with the Commonwealth's suspension of Zimbabwe in March 2002 (before Zimbabwe quit the organization in December 2003). ZANU-PF came under enormous domestic and international political pressure, especially in the wake of the 2008 general elections when the MDC won 99 to ZANU-PF's 97 parliamentary seats which, along with smaller parties, gave the opposition a majority. Crucially, the MDC defeated ZANU-PF in its rural strongholds of Manicaland and Masvingo provinces; these gains may speak to the loss of popular support due to the post-1997 land acquisition milieu which had no clear pro-poor rural development strategy, nor land tenure framework.¹¹⁴ Bracking points out that ZANU-PF's combination of nationalism and populist restitutionalism hide deepening class stratification.¹¹⁵ A case study of Chiredzi District, south-eastern Zimbabwe, revealed the tensions among war veterans, traditional leadership, and party-connected commercial farmers who were expanding their holdings at the expense of aspirant subalterns. "ZANU (PF) MPs and councillors walk a . . . tightrope. They currently have a close relationship with the war veterans, traditional leaders and local entrepreneurs, but are very conscious of having not lived up to expectations and demands in the past."¹¹⁶ But despite the results of 2008 it is by no means certain that multiparty politics will 'democratically empower' the rural populace in the communal areas given the interminable survival strategies that they must cope with in a rural landscape ever more inhospitable to smallholder systems.¹¹⁷ Moyo concedes that there was no social democratic movement to support/consolidate the redistributive rights of land occupations, though he is surely off the mark to equate the state-led land seizures as an indigenous movement akin to Chiapas. ZANU-PF itself is certainly not poised in the direction of 'social democracy', but neither is it correct to label it 'fascistic'.¹¹⁸ Dashwood argues that there is an absence of a left opposition to ZANU-PF, and that right parties are unlikely to appeal to the majority of Zimbabweans.¹¹⁹ At the same time it is neither clear the extent to which MDC (and for that matter CUF) can move beyond centre right politics nor whether left alternatives have traction in the current climate. Some have called for the Zimbabwean labour movement to strengthen links with civics and move to the left, or for the MDC to build rural base by re-visiting its land policy.¹²⁰ Yet as we have seen popular organizational forms such trade unions, co-operatives, and NGOs can be as much about bolstering the status quo, as forces for social transformation. Undoubtedly many citizens are wary of socialist narratives. Moreover the increasingly

brutalized hand-to-mouth existence of growing numbers of citizens, men and women, and including the middle classes, increasingly pose collective action problems. While Millennium Development Goals show poverty rate reductions in urban Tanzania, rates for urban/rural Zimbabwe and rural Tanzania reveal failing goals in halving extreme poverty by 2015 at current rates of growth.¹²¹ World Bank data shows life expectancy of 37 and 46 years for Zimbabwe and Tanzania, respectively, and this despite GDP growth rates of 6.9% 2000-04 in the case of Tanzania.¹²² The corrosion of social capital in both countries has seen many Zimbabweans and Tanzanians crave for a deeper existential meaning in struggling to survive with dignity and hope.¹²³ Presently Zimbabwe is wracked by hyper-inflation, the collapse of water and electricity supplies, and millions dependent on the World Food Programme (WFP) or remittances. Hundreds of thousands have sought work in a South Africa that is itself in the twilight of its liberationist honeymoon.

The CCM government is also seen in some Western policymaking quarters as a bulwark against Zanzibar's purported Islamism, analogous to US support for the 1964 Union to prevent Zanzibar from becoming 'the Cuba of the Indian Ocean'. This is a cross that the constitutional opposition on the Isles has had to bear since the advent of 'the war on terror'.¹²⁴ The donor boycott of the Zanzibar government (never directed at the Union government) was removed in the wake CCM's 'landslide' victory in the 2005 general elections when CCM's presidential candidate Jakaya Kikwete took 80.28% of presidential vote, with CCM Members of Parliament being elected or appointed in 258 of the 295 Union parliamentary seats. CUF, led by its presidential candidate Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, became the official opposition in the Union parliament with 11.68% of the presidential vote, and 22 out of 295 seats.¹²⁵ The Union political system reverted to a 'de facto' mono-party system. Yet CCM's mainland political base may not be as deep as the electoral statistics suggest. CCM is a 'strong' party not because of its early TANU pre-independence legacy,¹²⁶ but rather due to Tanzania's weak associational life, even compared to the standards of the African continent. This is due in part to demography whereby most of Tanzania mainland's population of approximately 37 million live in peripheral regions serviced by poor infrastructure. The '*Ruksa*' era further corroded social capital by loosening community trust and enhancing individualism, though the undertaking of local community projects may be an exception here.¹²⁷ As Goran Hyden puts it, poverty, corruption, banditry and migration blight the lives of the majority of Tanzanians: 'many people have given up hope that they will ever see a better livelihood. A fatalistic attitude has developed in urban and rural areas alike.'¹²⁸ Rural-urban migration in the absence of industrialization makes for a combustible politics in the urban areas. The funeral procession of Julius Nyerere witnessed nearly one million people pouring onto the streets of Dar es Salaam,¹²⁹ countless being '*walalahoi*' (Swahili, 'the dispossessed') many of whom no doubt lamented the loss of a leader perceived to have cared for them in post-socialist Tanzania. The 2005 poll on the Isles was once again close and controversial as Amani Abeid Karume defeated Seif Shariff Hamad, with CUF again resuming its role as official opposition in the House of Representatives.¹³⁰ President Jakaya Kikwete, also now African Union Chairman, is overseeing yet a third inter-party dialogue. But prospects for a lasting settlement in Zanzibar are slim as CCM Zanzibar foot-draggs on electoral reform and power sharing.¹³¹ The MDC now faces this quandary in light of its electoral gains of March 2008. Before his death in 1996 Abdulrahman Babu called for his latter-day party, NCCR- *Megeuzi*, to become a 'third force' on Zanzibar in order to break the CCM-CUF stalemate.¹³² But with CUF in parliamentary limbo, and the NCCR- *Megeuzi* long moribund, political Islam ironically may become Babu's 'third force' as the ranks of the desperate grow. In short, the dynamics on the Isles may synergize with the devolutionary cycle on the mainland.¹³³

While studies that contrast ideal polyarchic principles to actual practice in the radical nationalist model do gainfully reveal their 'democratic deficits' around autonomous organizing, civil liberties, and the conducting free and fair elections¹³⁴, it is our belief that only by examining the deep roots of conflicts, and the failure of these regimes to bring the benefits of independence equally to all regions and groups, can the challenges facing the grounding of popular control of the African state can be better comprehended. In Zimbabwe and Tanzania economic regression led to the unravelling of the post-independence coalition of forces formerly held in check by authoritarian politics and state expenditure.

Political liberalization revealed deep state-society fractures, irreconcilable national visions, and the reconstitution of politics around competing blocs. If comparatively well-integrated and stable states such as Zimbabwe and Tanzania are still in conflict over the basis of nationalism and post-independence state and nation building, then newer, less coherent states may face even greater struggles. This paper's findings have implications for our broader understanding of the relationship between radical nationalist regimes and 'third wave' democratization in countries such as Angola, South Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Algeria, and Guinea-Bissau. The 'unity' motif of nationalist struggle disguised and smothered diversity, rather than enabling the emergence of representative national identities and state forms. 'Stability' can mask authoritarianism while 'instability' can provide new leadership, innovative thinking and immense popular support. The political debates of the 1980s and 1990s were framed around the nationalist social contract formed in the 1950s and 1960s. Potent claims and counter-claims continue to be made about the nationalists' role in bringing liberation on the one hand, and their failure to bring the material and social benefits of liberation on the other and this remains an intrinsic aspect of the democratic terms of debate in post-colonial Africa.

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¹ 'Mugabe: We won't bow to the West', *Guardian* (Tanzania), 13 January 2005 www.ippmedia.com

² 'Joy as Zanzibar flies new flag', *BBC News* 12 January 2005 www.bbc.co.uk/news.

³ Similarly, when the Tanzanian Minister of Information visited Zimbabwe he urged the press to emphasize nationalistic themes in order to ensure they were not used by external enemies seeking to control African governments. 'Prioritize nationalistic ideologies minister urges private media', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 26 November 2004.

⁴ 'Mugabe: We won't bow to the West', *Guardian* (Tanzania), 13 January 2005 www.ippmedia.com

⁵ Liisa Laakso, 'Why are elections not democratic in Africa? Comparisons between the recent multi-party elections in Zimbabwe and Tanzania', *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 6(1) (1997), pp. 18-35.

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⁹ David Blair, *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (London: Continuum, 2003).

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¹¹ Patrick Bond, *Uneven Development: a study of finance, development, and underdevelopment* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998); Sarah Bracking, 'Development Denied: Autocratic Militarism in Post-Election Zimbabwe,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Nos. 104/105 (Jun/Sep 2005), p. 343.

¹² Paul J Kaiser, 'Structural adjustment and the Fragile Nation: the demise of social unity in Tanzania', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34, 2 (1994), pp. 227-237; Jeanette Hartmann, 'The State in Tanzania: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow' (University of Helsinki, IDS, Occasional Papers 12, 1991); Tim Kelsall, 'Shop windows and smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicisation of Tanzania', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40, 4 (2002), pp. 597-619; John Campbell, 'Nationalism, ethnicity and religion: fundamental conflicts and the politics of identity in Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (1), (1999), p. 110; Bruce E Heilman and Paul Kaiser, 'Religion, identity and politics in Tanzania', *Third World Quarterly* Vol 23, No. 4 (2002), pp. 691-709.

¹³ Dashwood & Pratt p. 223.

¹⁴ Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, *The Rise of Multipartyism and Democracy in the Context of Global Change* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1998), p. 93.

¹⁵ Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa 1876-1912* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1991), pp. 499-502, 616-621.

¹⁶ See for example Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 1995), pp 24-35, 48-72.

¹⁷ Accounts include Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* (London: James Currey, 1985); Norma J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (London: James Currey, 1985).

¹⁸ See Terence Ranger, *Are we not also men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe: 1920-64*. (London: James Currey, 1995).

¹⁹ Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War*.

²⁰ David Moore, 'The Zimbabwe People's Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?', in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 1995), pp. 73-86.

²¹ Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000); CCJP/LRF, *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace* (Harare: CCJP/LRF, 1997); ZimRights, *Choosing the Path to Peace and Development: Coming to terms with human rights violations of the 1982-1987 conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces*. (Harare: ZimRights, 1999); 'Division will destroy us, says Mugabe', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 18 October 1982; Jocelyn Alexander and Joann McGregor, 'Elections, Land and the Politics of Opposition in Matabeleland', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 1 (4) (2001), p. 513.

²² See Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the making of Tanzanian Nationalism* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), pp. 6-15.

²³ The standard work being M. F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

²⁴ Anthony Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath* (London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., 1981), pp. 90, 99.

²⁵ Abdul Sheriff, 'The Union and Struggle for Democracy in Zanzibar', in Rwekaza S. Mukandala & Haroub Othman (eds.), *Liberalization and Politics The 1990 Election in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam University Press, 1994), p. 151; Chief Minister Omar Ali Juma, *Zanzibar in Perspective A collection of speeches and statements* (Zanzibar: no publishing house, 1989), p. 25.

²⁶ Dashwood and Pratt, p. 241.

²⁷ The constitutional set-up was semi-federal in nature, with key powers going to a combined Tanganyika/Union government (e.g. military, currency, foreign affairs). As the second government Zanzibar remained with less strategic areas (e.g. health, primary and secondary education, agriculture, co-operatives). Articles of Union in Lofchie 1965, pp. 285-287.

²⁸ Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) p. 87.

²⁹ Sara Rich Dorman, 'Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe' unpublished DPhil thesis Oxford 2002. p. 85.

³⁰ 'No one party state, yet, Mugabe pledges', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 5 August 1982.

³¹ Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun', in Richard Werbner, (ed.), *Memory and the Postcolony* (London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 79; Mahmood Mamdani, 'State and Civil Society in Contemporary Africa: Reconceptualizing the Birth of State Nationalism and the Defeat of Popular Movements', *Africa Development* XV, 3-4 (1990), p. 55.

³² Kaiser, 'Structural adjustment and the Fragile Nation', p. 231.

³³ Hartmann, p. 9.

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- ³⁴ Lionel Cliffe, 'The Political System', in Lionel Cliffe (ed.) *One Party Democracy: the 1965 Tanzania General Elections* (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1967), pp. 10-13.
- ³⁵ Tim Kelsall, "Subjectivity, Collective Action, and the Governance Agenda in Tanzania" unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 2000 p. 83; see original for extensive references.
- ³⁶ Henceforth 'CCM Dodoma' refers to the Union section of the party (Dodoma being the capital); 'CCM Zanzibar' refers to the former ASP.
- ³⁷ Ibrahim Fokas Shao, *The Political Economy of Land Reform in Zanzibar* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1992), p. 47.
- ³⁸ See Aboud Jumbe, *The Partner-ship Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union: 30 Turbulent Years* (Dar es Salaam: Amana Publishers, 1994).
- ³⁹ World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 2006* (Washington, D.C.), pp. 81-82.
- ⁴⁰ Hevina Dashwood, *Zimbabwe The Political Economy of Transformation* (University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 29, 202.
- ⁴¹ See Lovemore M. Zinyama 'Local Farmers Organizations and Rural Development in Zimbabwe', in D.R. Fraser Taylor and Fiona MacKenzie (eds.) *Development From Within Survival in Rural Africa*. (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-57; Dashwood, p. 51, 109.
- ⁴² Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), pp. 114-117; Organization of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe, Action Plan for 1999; and Andrew Nyathi, *Tomorrow is Built Today. Experiences of war, colonialism, and the struggle for collective co-operatives in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Anvil Press, 1990).
- ⁴³ Personal communication, 19 September 1991.
- ⁴⁴ Dorman, 'Inclusion and Exclusion' See especially pp. 64-85.
- ⁴⁵ Sara Rich Dorman, 'NGOs and State in Zimbabwe: implications for civil society theory', in Bjorn Beckman, Anders Sjogren and Eva Hannsen (eds), *Civil Society and Authoritarianism in the Third World* (Stockholm: PODSU, 2001.), pp. 142, 153-4; John Makumbe, *Democracy and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints of Decentralisation* (Harare: SAPE, 1998), p. 76; Jocelyn Alexander, 'The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe: Case Studies of Insiza and Chimanimani Districts, 1940-1990', unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford, 1993, p. 184.
- ⁴⁶ For example, Sam Geza, then a secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Technology in the Zimbabwean government, proposed stimulating mass internal demand through the deepening and widening of manufactured exports linked to the development of irrigation, small scale industries, and cooperatives, only to be replaced by a pro-market reformer. Dashwood, pp. 116-117, 120-122.
- ⁴⁷ Dashwood, p. 172.
- ⁴⁸ Peter Alexander, 'Zimbabwean Workers, the MDC and the 2000 Elections', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 85 (2000), p. 388.
- ⁴⁹ See Veronica Brand, Rodreck Mupedziswa and Perpetua Gumbo, 'Structural Adjustment, Women and Informal Sector Trade in Harare', in Peter Gibbon (ed.), *Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995), pp. 132-214.
- ⁵⁰ Lloyd M. Sachikonye 'Industrial Relations and Labour Relations Under ESAP in Zimbabwe', in Peter Gibbon (ed.), *Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe* (Uppsala : Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995), pp. 38-131; Dashwood, pp. 98,105
- ⁵¹ Clayton, p. 154.
- ⁵² See Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 263-271; Dean McHenry, *Limited Choices The Political Struggle for Socialism in Tanzania* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994), pp. 105-128; Leander Snyder, 'Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania: Connects and Disconnects', *African Studies Review*, Volume 49, Number 1 (April 2006), pp. 93-118.
- ⁵³ Issa Shivji, 'Electoral Politics, Liberalization and Democracy', in Rwekaza Mukandala and Haroub Othman, (eds.), *Liberalization and Politics: the 1990 Elections in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1994), pp 21-23, 29.
- ⁵⁴ Greg Cameron, 'Protest and Co-operation in Post-Revolutionary Zanzibar', unpublished PhD thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2002, pp. 109,119.
- ⁵⁵ Issa Shivji, 'Electoral Politics, Liberalization and Democracy', p. 23.
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- ⁵⁸ See Shao, p. 52.
- ⁵⁹ See Zinnat Bader, 'The Social Conditions and Consequences of the 1964 Land Reform in Zanzibar', unpublished PhD thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London, 1984, pp.307-308.
- ⁶⁰ McHenry, p. 153
- ⁶¹ Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha, *Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania*. (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1992), p. 34.
- ⁶² Peter Gibbon, Kjell J. Havnevik, Kenneth Hermelu. *A Blighted Harvest The World Bank and African Agriculture in the 1980s* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1993), pp. 53-54.
- ⁶³ David McDermott Hughes, 'Rezoned for Business: How Eco-tourism Unlocked Black Farmland in Eastern Zimbabwe', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.1, No.4 (2001), pp. 575 –599.
- ⁶⁴ Keith Griffin, Azizur Rahman Khan and Amy Ickowitz, 'Poverty and the Distribution of Land', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Volume 2 Number 3 (July 2002), p. 294.
- ⁶⁵ See Peter Gibbon, 'Cooperative Cotton Marketing, Liberalization, and 'Civil Society' in Tanzania', *Journal of Agrarian Change* Volume 1, Number 3 (July 2001): 389-440.
- ⁶⁶ Zanzibar Revolutionary Government's Act No. 16 of 1992, *An Act To Establish Free Economic Zones*.
- ⁶⁷ Shao, p. 92
- ⁶⁸ Dashwood, p. 107; John S. Saul and Richard Saunders, 'Mugabe, Gramsci and Zimbabwe at Twenty-Five', in John S. Saul, *The Next Liberation Struggle Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in Southern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005).pp. 136-7.
- ⁶⁹ See Rwekaza S. Mukandala, 'Whither Ujamaa: Ideological Premises of the 1990 Elections', in . Rwekaza S. Mukandala and Haroub Othman (eds), *Liberalization and Politics: the 1990 Election in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1994), pp. 54, 60.
- ⁷⁰ See McHenry, pp. 29-46, 217-222.
- ⁷¹ The extent to which the leadership code had hitherto been honoured by the political elite is difficult to gauge. But many Tanzanians believe Prime Minister Sokoine's fatal 1984 car 'accident' happened when his Nyerere-backed anti-corruption drives entered into the 'House of CCM' itself. Cameron, 'Protest and Cooperation', p. 31.
- ⁷² John S. Saul, 'The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote, and General Amin', in John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), pp. 350-390.
- ⁷³ Bracking, p. 343-344.
- ⁷⁴ Gibbon et. al., *A Blighted Harvest*, p. 146.
- ⁷⁵ Dashwood, pp. 86-87; Tim Kelsall, 'Shop Windows and smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicisation of Tanzania,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40, 4 (2002), p. 612.
- ⁷⁶ See Y. Tandon (ed.) *University of Dar es Salaam debate on class, state and imperialism* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1982); Letter to the editor, *Journal of African Marxists*, Issue 3 (January 1983); For a surreal-like leftist party document published at the dawn of the structural adjustment era see *CCM Programmu ya Chama cha Mapinduzi 1987 hadi 2002* (Swahili, The Programme of CCM 1987-2002) (Dar es Salaam: Kiuta, 1988).
- ⁷⁷ Saul and Saunders, p. 313; Cameron 'Protest and Cooperation', p. 148.
- ⁷⁸ Lumumba-Kasongo, pp. 85, 89.
- ⁷⁹ Rita Abrahamson, *Disciplinary Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000), p. 9; William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).p. 29.
- ⁸⁰ Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Democratization in Africa. The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1997), p. 26.
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- ⁸² See Sara Rich Dorman 'Make Sure They Count Nicely this Time – The Politics of Elections and Election Observing in Zimbabwe', in *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (July 2005), pp. 155-177; and Norma Kriger, 'ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion', *African Affairs*, 104 (414) (2005), 1-34.
- ⁸³ 'No one-party state by law – President', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 28 September 1990; 'No move on one-party issue', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 3 October 1990.
- ⁸⁴ Dashwood, pp. 91-92

⁸⁵ Alexander, p. 386

⁸⁶ Sara Rich Dorman, 'NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to Exclusion', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, 4 (2003), pp 199-201.

⁸⁷ Dorman, 'From Inclusion to Exclusion', pp. 845-863.

⁸⁸ Tuulikki Pietiliet, Sanna Ojalampi-wamai and Liisa Laakso 'Elections at the Borderland Voter Opinion in Arusha and Kilimanjaro Tanzania', in Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso (eds), *Multiparty Elections in Africa*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), pp. 278-298. There is also evidence that international NGOs' promotion of nominalist-framed indigenous rights has weakened alliance building between pastoralist and peasant communities. See Greg Cameron, 'The globalization of indigenous rights in Tanzanian pastoralist NGOs', in Alan Bicker, Paul Sillitoe and Johan Pottier (eds.), *Development and Local Knowledge: New approaches to issues in natural resource management, conservation and agriculture* (London: Routledge Press, 2004), 135-163.

⁸⁹ McHenry, pp. 134-136, 151; Mongula, 'The Dependent Character of Development Planning in Tanzania,' *EASSRR* vol. XXII, no. 2 (June 2006), p. 75.

⁹⁰ *Daily News* (Tanzania), 10 October 1991.

⁹¹ Douglas G. Anglin 'Zanzibar: Political Impasse and Commonwealth Mediation' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18, 1 (2000), p. 42.

⁹² 'Minister attacks acts of sabotage', *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 5 February 1999.

⁹³ 'Reconciliation policy may be revisited: President', *Sunday Mail*, (Zimbabwe), 28 February 1999.

⁹⁴ For different explanations for the collapse of 1998 donors conference see David Moore, 'Keeping up to the Mugabes' *H-Net review* (February 2002); for actual donors of the NCA see Sithole, p. 162.

⁹⁵ Alexander, p. 403. In 2005 the MDC suffered a factional split between its parliamentary caucus and general supporters.

⁹⁶ Sandra J. Maclean, 'Mugabe at war: the political economy of conflict in Zimbabwe', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2002), pp. 513-528; John Makumbe, 'Zimbabwe's Hijacked Election', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, Number 4 (October 2002), pp. 90- 91; Alexander, pp. 390, 393; The Zimbabwe Liberators Platform came out against Mugabe and therefore is not a monolithic group. Alexander, p. 400.

⁹⁷ Masipula Sithole 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 12, Number 1 (January 2001), p. 167; Bracking, p. 349.

⁹⁸ See Dean McHenry's chapter on Zanzibar entitled 'Subnationalism and Socialism' pp. 189-214. Important to bear in mind is Zanzibar's constitutional status whereby opposition is articulated at both the Union and Zanzibar levels. Some federalists in the now-defunct ZAPU advocated federalism, while post-2000, some in the MDC advocated federalism, perhaps influenced by South Africa's federalist system.

⁹⁹ The following paragraph relies extensively on Alexander and McGregor, 'Politics of Opposition', pp. 511, 520, 523-525, 528.

¹⁰⁰ Cameron, 'Zanzibar's Turbulent Transition', p. 320.

¹⁰¹ Personal observation, South Pemba, September 1995.

¹⁰² In pre-multiparty Zanzibar the opposition had called for a referendum on the Union

¹⁰³ Cameron, 'Zanzibar's Turbulent Transition', p. 316; Moore, 'Triple Crisis.' footnote 51.

¹⁰⁴ Mukumbe, 'Zimbabwe's Hijacked Election', p. 92.

¹⁰⁵ The bulk of CUF's funding apparently derives from member donations and local businessmen, with perhaps some sources coming from the Gulf countries. Mohammed Ali Bakari, *Democratisation Process in Zanzibar A Retarded Transition* (Hamburg: Hamburg African Studies, 2001), pp. 190-192.

¹⁰⁶ Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha, *The Anticlimax in Kwahani Zanzibar. Participation and Multipartyism in Tanzania* (DSM: DSM University Press, 1993), 66.

¹⁰⁷ Keith Griffin, Azizur Rahman Khan and Amy Ickowitz, p. 294.

¹⁰⁸ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006; William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 327

¹⁰⁹ The coup attempt reinforced Mugabe's claims that Britain pursues regime change strategies in Africa. 'Mann reveals Britain and Spain were involved in regime change plot', 11 March 2008 <http://talksimbabwe.com> (accessed 12 March 2008).

¹¹⁰ For left perspectives see David Rowan, 17-2-01 'Tanzania: Brutal government clampdown on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba', 17 February 2001, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/feb2001/zan-f17.shtmlwsw.org>

¹¹¹ World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 2006*, Washington, D.C. pp. 94-95.

¹¹² World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 2006*, Washington, D.C. p. 89.

- ¹¹³ Mongula, p. 75; One donor-supported outfit called Adam Smith International hired popular Tanzanian musicians to praise privatisation with lines like: “Our old industries are dry like crops and privatization brings the rain.”
- ¹¹⁴ Dashwood, p. 181; see Moore *H-Net*; The presidential vote was razor close, with ZANU-PF forcing MDC out of the race before the presidential the run-off could be held. Leo Zeilig, ‘Zimbabwe: imperialism, hypocrisy and fake nationalism’, *International Socialism* Issue 119, posted 24 June 2008 (accessed 7 November 2007).
- ¹¹⁵ Bracking, pp. 346, 349, 351.
- ¹¹⁶ Joseph Chaumba, Ian Sconnes and William Wolmer, “New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe” in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30. No. 98 (December 2003), pp. 600-601, 603.
- ¹¹⁷ Sam Moyo, ‘Land Reform and Zimbabwe’s Troubled Transition to Democratic Governance’, in Julius O. Ionvbere and John Mukum Mbaku (eds.) *Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa Lessons from Country Experiences* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), pp. 319, 342; For structural perspectives see David Moore, ‘Zimbabwe’s Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation-State Formation and Democratization in the Age of Neo-liberal Globalization’, *African Studies Quarterly*, 7, no. 2 & 3 [online] URL: <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a2.htm>
- ¹¹⁸ Kidane Meggisteab, ‘Democratization and State Building in Africa: How Compatible Are They?’ in Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril Daddieh (eds.) *State Building and Democratization in Africa* (Westport Conn: Praeger 1999), p. 32; Bracking 355.
- ¹¹⁹ Dashwood p. 109.
- ¹²⁰ Patrick Bond and Richard Saunders ‘Labour, the State, and the Struggle for a Democratic Zimbabwe’, *Monthly Review Press*, Volume 57, Number 7 (2005) <http://www.monthlyreview.org/> (accessed 27 July 2007); Alexander p. 399.
- ¹²¹ Data further show advances in primary and secondary school enrolments and primary health in Tanzania. David E. Sahn and David C. Stifel, ‘Progress Toward the Millennium Development Goals in Africa’, June 2002, p. 11
- ¹²² Gross National Income has increased by 2.4% over the same period. World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 2006* (Washington, D.C, 2006). pp. 25-26; UNICEF data on Zanzibar show that 102/1,000 children die before the age of 5 due to malnutrition, malaria and poverty; a comparable island state, Mauritius, recorded 14/1,000 deaths based on sustained growth. *IRIN* 13 July, 2005.
- ¹²³ See David Maxwell, ‘The Durawall of Faith: Pentecostal Spirituality in Neo-liberal Zimbabwe’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 35.1 (2005), pp. 4-32.
- ¹²⁴ For literature potentially reinforcing such perceptions see Giles Foden, *Zanzibar*, London: Faber and Faber, 2002.
- ¹²⁵ African Elections Database, http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html#2005_National_Assembly_Election. (accessed 27 October 2008).
- ¹²⁶ A claim made by Benjamin Smith, ‘Life of the Party The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule’, *World Politics* 57 (April 2005), 421-451.
- ¹²⁷ Goran Hyden, ‘Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania,’ *Journal of Democracy*, 10, 4, (1999), pp. 142-155.
- ¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 153.
- ¹²⁹ ‘Nyerere’s return’ *The Guardian* (UK), 19 October 1999.
- ¹³⁰ See Annie-Lise Mjatvedt, Zanzibar: Presidential and House of Representatives Elections October 2005, NORDEM Report, (May 2005). www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/publikasjonsliste.html.
- ¹³¹ 27 March 2006 private communication with Kjetil Tronvoll; The East African (Nairobi), 24 March 2008 – ‘Anxiety As CCM Top Organ Holds Meeting a Joint Report’ allafrica.com/stories.
- ¹³² Abdulrahman Babu, ‘Wanted: A Third Force in Zanzibar Politics’ (no date).
- ¹³³ See Kjersti Larsen (ed), *Knowledge, Renewal and Religion on the Swahili Coast* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, forthcoming).
- ¹³⁴ M.A. Mohammed Salih, ‘African Liberation Movement Governments and Democracy’, *Democratization*, Vol 14, No. 4 (August 2007), pp. 669-685.