When the author visited the southern Thai province of Yala in January, a security official presented him with a 2009 calendar, featuring fourteen historical occasions on which Siam (later Thailand) had lost territory. Using maps, locations and dates, it illustrated how Siam had progressively diminished in size, as lands had been successively ceded to Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Malaya. This was the personal calendar of the 4th Army Commander, the senior general responsible for Thailand’s southern region. The unstated message was clear: Pattani must not be ‘lost’ to the separatists. Thailand’s national pride was at stake. By evoking historical myths to suggest a narrative of humiliation and vulnerability, the calendar perfectly illustrated collective Thai fears about the future, and the difficulties of addressing such fears calmly and dispassionately.

A low-intensity violent conflict has been under way in Thailand’s ‘Deep South’ since late 2001, with violence increasing sharply after January 2004. The conflict reflects resistance to rule from Bangkok among some sections of society. The region was only formally incorporated into Siam in 1909; around 80 per cent of residents are staunchly Malay and Muslim, in an otherwise predominantly Buddhist nation defined by unifying myths of ‘Thainess’. Intermittent violent and non-violent resistance has occurred regularly during the past century. From the 1960s to the 1980s, fighting was led by organised militant groups such as PULO and the BRN, and was directed primarily against the Thai security forces. In the early 1980s, an elite compact was agreed between the militants and the Thai state; militants were granted an amnesty, and the Prem Tinsulanond government set up special security and consultative arrangements to manage the region. During the more open politics of the 1990s, some Malay Muslim MPs gained ministerial office, while a new tier of sub-district organisations – a kind of elected local council – created greater political space for increased Muslim representation. Despite the appearance of greater tolerance and more democracy, the Deep South remained firmly under the central control of Bangkok. As in the rest of the country, provincial governors were career bureaucrats appointed by the Interior Ministry and were not popularly chosen or elected. The controversial premiership of former police officer Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–06) was associated with a heavy-handed approach to governance and security matters in the South, and coincided with renewed militant violence. Prominent Malay Muslim politicians loyal to Thaksin were undermined and discredited during this period; they appeared to have been captured and co-opted by the Thai state. Neither virtuous bureaucratic rule – by ‘good’ civil servants and military officers – nor representative electoral politics on Thai terms were able to plug Bangkok’s legitimacy deficit in the region. The Malay Muslim elite, both political and religious, had been thoroughly contaminated and discredited by a protracted dalliance with the Thai state. While as recently as the 1950s some elements of the Southern Thai insurgency sought to ‘re-join’ Malaysia, arguing that the border provinces had ended up on the wrong side of an arbitrary line drawn between Siam and British Malaya in the early twentieth century, latterly militants have consistently demanded an independent Pattani state.

From 2004 onwards, a renewed militant movement has been able to exploit the fragmented and essentially leaderless society in the region to promote murder and mayhem. The precise nature of this movement remains a matter of debate. Most attacks are carried out by small groups of juwae (fighters), young men predominantly aged between eighteen and twenty-five. Some analysts believe that the militants are essentially a reconfigured version of the old separatist groups, perhaps led by the shadowy BRN Co-ordinate. Others argue that the militant movement is extremely decen-
centralised, based on a cell-like, village-level structure, and lacks an explicit central command and control. In other words, the militant movement may be a ‘network without a core’, despite having some degree of shared training and coordination. The goals of the militants remain unclear, but seem to range from a simple desire to antagonise the Thais, to demands for a separate state and aspirations for substantive autonomy.

Around 3,500 people have died in the Southern Thai insurgency since 2004, yet the conflict remains little known in the wider world. The most relevant regional comparison with Southern Thailand is to the conflict in Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines, though there are important differences. Most analysts of the Pattani insurgency believe that this remains a localised conflict over territory and identity, rather than part of a global jihad that fits neatly Bush-era narratives of a ‘war on terror’.

While many of the victims and perpetrators of the Pattani insurgency are Muslims, the violence has not been persuasively linked to standard narratives about international jihadist networks. The conflict is largely confined to the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat (and four districts of neighbouring Songkla), a thousand kilometres from Bangkok, and a world away from the ‘other’ Thai South, the beach resorts of Phuket and Ko Samui. Two large-scale incidents in 2004 captured widespread attention: the simultaneous militant attacks of 28 April, immediately followed by the storming of the historic Kru-Ze mosque by the Thai Army; and the brutal dispersal of a peaceful protest at Tak Bai on 25 October, during which seventy-eight Malay Muslim men perished after being loaded five-deep into military vehicles. Nearly 200 perished during these two days alone. While central to the story of the insurgency, both these episodes proved deeply unrepresentative of what followed. Most subsequent deaths have been in ones and twos, and only very rarely has any single incident claimed more than ten lives. Put crudely, not enough people are being killed at once for the violence to claim serious international attention. While the Pattani conflict has only been matched in intensity by Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgency has assumed a routine character, unremitting but relentlessly unspectacular. While extraordinary attacks on security forces gain most attention, this is actually a war of attrition, often targeting civilian victims.

The Play Within a Play

Even within Thailand, the South rarely figures as a major news story. Since late 2005 it has been overshadowed by an ongoing national conflict between supporters of (now former) billionaire businessman Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and those who prefer the monarchy, the army and the country’s traditional institutions. This colour-coded feud between so called ‘yellow shirts’ (the pro-monarchy People’s Alliance for Democracy, or PAD) and the ‘red shirts’ (the pro-Thaksin UDD) has gradu-
ally eclipsed and subsumed other political issues in the Kingdom. Since 2006, media attention, both domestic and international, has focused mainly on Bangkok: two general elections, a senate election, a military coup, a new constitution, and several dramatic judicial interventions to ban politicians from office and dissolve political parties. Also covered were street protests by the PAD and UDD; in April 2009, for instance, the UDD also disrupted an ASEAN summit and attacked the prime minister’s car. For many, however, the Southern conflict resembles a sideshow rather than a struggle for the soul of Thailand.

In reality, though, the sideshow is integral to the main act, a play within a play that illuminates Thailand’s central conflict. The question for Thailand is a simple one: what is the basis of the country’s legitimacy? Officially, the answer is equally straightforward: the constitution, the executive and the legislature. The Thai people are sovereign. Yet the reality is much more ambiguous. The much-loved 1997 ‘people’s constitution’, the high watermark of Thai liberalism, was torn up by the military on the night of the 19 September 2006 coup d’état. In the end, for many Thais, royal prestige and authority, especially the personal charisma of the current King Bhumibol (the world’s longest serving monarch) trumps the authority of prime ministers and parliaments. In theory, Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, but in practice the monarch enjoys an extra-constitutional aura that allows the royal family and those around them to exercise considerable informal influence. In recent years the operation of this ‘network monarchy’ has become increasingly exposed to critical scrutiny.

For many, the basis of Thai legitimacy remains the long-standing shibboleth ‘Nation, Religion, King’. In other words, Thailand’s national identity – linked to historical myths centring on the way in which King Chulalongkorn averted formal colonisation – is predicated largely on extra-legal, pre-modern notions of ‘Thainess’ and royalism. King Chulalongkorn is believed to have hit upon a winning formula that served Siam – later Thailand – extremely well. Tinkering with this configuration – in which all power is centralised and all ethnic identities are subordinated to an overwhelmingly dominant (yet highly constructed) Thai-ness – is considered dangerous to the future of the Thai nation. In fact, Thailand is a composite of disparate identities, including Mon, Khmer, Lao (the major ethnicity of the north-eastern region of Isan, which contains a third of the country’s population), Lanna (Northerners) and Chinese. ‘Real’ Thai are hard to find, if indeed they may be said to exist at all.

Given the primacy of the Army-controlled Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) over security arrangements in the South – as decreed by the outgoing military-appointed Surayud Chulanont government early in 2008 – civilian agencies such as the reconstituted Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) lack either the clout or the credibility effectively to spearhead a more reconciliatory or participatory community-based approach to the conflict. The short-lived People’s Power Party (PPP)-led coalition government headed by Samak Sundaravej (February to September) and then Somchai Wongsawat (September to December) spent most of its term in office trying to counter anti-government protests led by the self-styled PAD, which held continuous demonstrations in the Thai capital from early May until the beginning of December 2008, seizing control of Government House and later of Bangkok’s two airports. The PPP government failed to pass any legislation at all during almost a year in office, and paid no real attention to the Southern conflict, the management of which was left firmly in the hands of the security forces.

The creation in December 2008 of a Thai government headed by Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva provided an opportunity for a fresh look at the Southern conflict. The new prime minister declared that bringing peace to the South was a top priority for his administration. The Democrat Party has electoral strongholds in the South, and has historically presented itself as the party with expertise and understanding on the troubled region. However, in reality the South of Thailand needs to be understood as two distinct entities: the Malay Muslim majority ‘border provinces’ of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, and the ‘Upper South’ comprising another ten provinces. Satun, a Muslim majority border province not affected by violence, really needs a category of its own. The Democrats are the party of the Upper South, not the Malay-dominated lower south. Despite talking the talk of prioritising a resolution of the Southern violence, Abhisit has so far proved a weak premier, challenged by opposition forces and undermined by tensions within his own administration and support base. His ideas for a special cabinet committee and the gradual civilianisation of ISOC have yet to bear fruit.

### The Changing Security Situation

Despite Abhisit’s talk of ‘politics leading the military’, in practice the South remains largely the preserve of military interests. Thai security forces have claimed since mid-2007 that their tougher approach on the ground is yielding real results in terms of curtailing the violence. A new policy of mass arrests of suspects, coupled with locking down suspected ‘red’ villages, has been in operation since June 2007. Along with ‘inviting’ cohorts of Malay Muslim men from insurgent-intensive areas to spend extended periods undergoing vocational training in military camps, this more aggressive security policy (known as the ‘battle plan for the southern lands’) has made some impact on the number of violent incidents (see Figure 1).

### Figure 1: Number of Violent Incidents, Deaths and Injuries in Thailand’s Deep South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Violent Incidents</th>
<th>Deaths and Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>1,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>2,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1,232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Srisomphob Jitpiromsri, PSU and Deep South Watch, January 2009
Police statistics suggest that there were 866 deaths in 2007 and 546 deaths in 2008. Statistics compiled by Dr Srisom-pob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University (whose data on the violence is widely accepted as authoritative) show that the severity of the violence is growing; since 2006, most incidents have resulted in more than one casualty. By 2008 the number of incidents was down to less than half of 2004 levels, but casualties were only slightly lower than in 2004. According to Srisom-pob, the majority of those killed in the violence to date have been Muslim: 1,788 persons, as opposed to 1,384 Buddhists – though far more Buddhists than Muslims have been injured. Muslim victims of violence include both so-called munafik (traitors to their religion) killed by militants, and a smaller number who have been extra-judicially murdered by the authorities.

The number of minor attacks has declined sharply. Militants appear to have adopted a new strategy of concentrating on more deadly attacks, with a renewed emphasis on targeting the security forces. In early November 2008, for example, sixty people were injured in bomb blasts, just a week after then Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat had visited the region and declared that violence was declining. Militant activity has waxed and waned in different districts across the three provinces; in some former insurgency-intensive areas of Narathiwat and Yala levels of violence have decreased considerably, but the militant activity has apparently been displaced to different areas, including previously relatively peaceful districts of Pattani. As the security forces adjust their strategy and tactics, the militants are responding with new approaches. For example, the ‘show of support’ militant tactic of using mass protests by villagers to surround communities or encircle locations such as police stations, prevalent in 2005 and 2006, has now been largely abandoned because it resulted in too many arrests. During 2008, militants made use of larger and more precisely targeted bombs, including car bombs.

Both analysts of the conflict and some key informants within the security community have argued that the apparent gains produced by more hard-line methods are somewhat misleading. Even General Vaipot Srinual, deputy permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defence and one of the military’s top experts on the conflict, has cautioned against assuming that the situation was really improving in 2008. In Malay Muslim communities across the region, resentment against the security forces was undiminished, and in some areas was actually increasing. By now most people knew someone who had been questioned, arrested or ill-treated. A very detailed January 2009 report by Amnesty International found widespread evidence that torture of suspects had become a standard operating procedure, routinely practised by army Rangers and other military and police units, often carried out in unofficial detention centres which included at least three Buddhist temples. In one high profile case, imam Yapha Kaseng from Narathiwat died of injuries sustained in custody at the Special Taskforce 39 camp inside Wat Suan Tham in April 2008; an inquest later found that he had been unlawfully tortured and killed. While the security forces were struggling to gain the upper hand in a conventional war for control of territory, the real conflict was...
a war over ideas and feelings, in which the Thai state was unsuccessful.

On the ground, security measures are more visible than a year ago: checkpoints abound, though many are only operated intermittently. The tactic of properly manned and operated mobile checkpoints, as used in most similar conflicts around the world, continues to elude the Thai security forces. The army has now acquired ninety-eight South African-made REVA armoured personnel carriers, which are raised high above the road and are designed to withstand the impact of roadside bombs. The ubiquitous deployment of these REVAs serves to heighten locals’ sense that their region is being forcibly occupied by the Thai authorities; on a psychological level, increased militarisation may actually be counter-productive by fuelling resentments.

The REVAs are one illustration of another salient trend: the huge budget allocated to security and ‘development’ activities in the South, the great bulk of which passes through the military, partly via ISOC. Greatly increased following the military coup of September 2006, the total budget for the period 2004–08 was 81,748 million Thai baht (US$2,292,000,000), with a further 27,547 million baht (US$772,284,000) allocated for 2009. These levels of expenditure are a further source of resentment amongst most Malay Muslim and some Buddhist communities in the South, who feel that despite these vast budgets, they feel little benefit locally in terms of enhanced security or economic assistance.

Without giving credence to conspiracy theories that attribute most of the violence to the security forces themselves, it should be noted that these budgetary increases give the military a significant stake in the conflict, and may reduce its incentive to support solutions that might further curtail or end the violence. Given that much of the front-line, day-to-day security work in the South has actually been delegated to conscripts from the northeast, to rapidly-expanding low-cost Ranger outfits (Rangers are not professional soldiers, but volunteers hired on short contracts) and to various village defence and militia groups, the professional army is being paid handsomely to wage a war that it has largely sub-contracted to other actors.

Command and control remains an issue. Although Southern Thailand notionally falls under the jurisdiction of the 4th Army Region, the 4th Army is generally viewed as the least prestigious and professional of the army’s regional commands; because of their involvement in illegal business activities, their cliquish organisational culture, and their claims to ‘special understanding’ of the insurgency, officers of the 4th Army are often mistrusted by the top brass. No 4th Army commander has ever been promoted to the top post of Army Commander-in-Chief. Partly because of this mistrust, and partly to share the benefits of the budgetary allocations made to quell the insurgency, the current Army Commander-in-Chief General Anupong Paochinda has assigned officers and troops from the other three army regions to assume leading security roles in the southern border provinces. The 4th Army is currently responsible for security only in four districts of Songkhla province; the 1st Army (normally responsible for Bangkok, central and western Thailand) oversees Narathiwat, the 2nd Army (northeast) oversees Pattani, and the 3rd Army (north) oversees Yala. Security structures and the commanders responsible have been changed repeatedly since 2002, and even some army officers themselves appear confused about current lines of command. One problem is that officers and soldiers from other regions tend to be assigned to the Deep South only for short periods; the military has not developed good methods of learning lessons and fostering institutional memory to support government efforts to suppress the insurgency.

Security measures are supposed to operate hand-in-hand with the prosecution of those apprehended on suspicion of engaging in violence. In 2008, there was a significant increase in the numbers of security case suspects being brought to trial; after a long spell of few convictions, by the end of 2008 more than 150 defendants had been convicted in 105 cases. In fifteen cases, militants were given the death penalty, in twenty-seven cases life imprisonment, and in the remaining sixty-three cases defendants were awarded other jail terms. However, another fifty-five cases were dropped...
after reaching court, usually because judges felt that there was insufficient evidence. Given that between January 2004 and October 2008 more than 3,000 people were killed, and that 6,050 security cases had been investigated by the authorities as of October 2008, the proportion of cases reaching a successful conviction was still woefully small. The police identified suspects in only 20 per cent of cases (1,223), and in almost a third of these cases (338) they were unable to apprehend the suspects. In other words, the criminal justice system is not proving an effective means of countering the militant violence: alternative approaches are badly needed.

Towards Political Solutions?
There has been little public acknowledgement from the Thai state that the conflict in the South is essentially a political problem, since this would involve recognising the scale of Bangkok’s legitimacy crisis in the region. Like others before him, Prime Minister Abhisit has been speaking the language of tolerance, justice and fairness, when the core problem is actually one of power, participation and accountability. Notions of autonomy for the region have long been considered ‘off the table’, since the Thai constitution specifies that the country is an ‘indivisible’ unitary state. To advocate autonomy could be considered a treasonous act of disrespect towards the monarchy.

Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that senior Thais are beginning to ‘think the unthinkable’ in relation to the Deep South. Elder statesman and former royal physician Dr Prawase Wasi – the architect of the liberal 1997 constitution – has hinted as much publicly. Then interior minister Chalerm Yubamrung openly expressed his support for autonomy in February 2008, only to be quickly silenced. Behind closed doors, many leading figures now agree; General Surayud Chulanont, who served as prime minister after the 2006 coup, is said to be among them. The difficulty is how to mainstream such debates and gain wider acceptance for decentralisation proposals, both from the public and from the security sector. The process will be necessarily gradual.

Despite the Thai government’s insistence that it will not negotiate with militants over the Southern conflict, it is an open secret that various forms of ‘dialogue’ have already taken place. These include talks on the Malaysian island of Langkawi, brokered by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, in 2005–06; and a meeting in Bogor, Indonesia on 20–21 September 2008, initiated by Indonesian vice-president Jusuf Kalla. To date these meetings have made little progress, for two main reasons. First, the representatives of the militants have declined to prove their credentials – for example, by calling a short cessation of hostilities – and it remains unclear whether they really command insurgents on the ground. A bizarre fake ‘ceasefire’ declared by some supposed militants on TV Channel 5 (the Army’s television station) on 17 July 2008 illustrated the problems surrounding authentication of the movement’s leaders. Second, the Thai authorities have brought little to the table, since they refuse to discuss substantive questions of governance, autonomy or decentralisation. The Thai side appears to have been playing for time, perhaps hoping to find ways of co-opting those behind the insurgency.

Thailand is currently in the grip of intense anxiety. The legacy of Siam’s creation of a modern nation-state, viewed as the crowning achievement of King Chulalongkorn, has been consolidated during the reign of King Bhumibol. Communism has been defeated, discontent in the northeast and insurgency in the south have been held in check, and the last fifty years have seen remarkable economic growth and rising national pride. Yet the King is now elderly, has largely withdrawn to the seaside town of Hua Hin, and the twilight years of his reign have arrived. The future, both for the monarchy and the nation itself, remains profoundly uncertain. Precisely because the legitimacy of the Thai state is so inextricably bound up with the present occupant of the throne, people fear that anything could happen in the not-too-distant future.

Into this vacuum have stepped various new and resurgent forces. One example was the alliance of groups associated with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who sought to make electoral success the basis for government legitimacy. Another was a revived Malay Muslim militant movement, seeking to resuscitate old ‘separatist’ political demands in the Deep South, and to challenge the legitimacy of a hegemonic royalist Thai-ness. These forces, and other counter-forces associated with the monarchy and the status quo, have staged a series of actions during the new millennium. The revived militancy in Thailand’s Deep South is just one of a number of movements that are staging increasingly realistic dress rehearsals for the larger crisis that many fear could surround the impending royal succession. Moreover, the political landscape is dangerous over-centralised and lacks sufficient direction to respond to current challenges. The southern insurgency is at core a challenge to the legitimacy of the Thai state, and a pre-emptive strike that could culminate in a radical reorganisation of power. Thailand’s southern violence is the microcosm of a potentially wide-ranging civil conflict in the country. As such, this neglected conflict deserves far greater local and international attention than it currently receives. The map of Thailand need not be re-drawn, but it must be at the heart of the debate about the country’s future.

Duncan McCargo is professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leeds. He recently spent a year conducting fieldwork in Pattani. His latest books are: Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence (ed.) (NUS Press, 2007); and Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
NOTES


6 Speaking at a Deep South Watch conference in Hat Yai on 18 January 2009, Dr Srisompob Jitpiromsri referred to this facetiously as ‘Kanmuang thi sapson nam kantahan thi sapson’ (‘Confused politics leading a confused military’).


9 Some of these theories are critically reviewed in Marc Askew, Conspiracy, Politics and a Disorderly Border: The Trouble to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand Deep South, Policy Studies 29 (Southeast Asia), (Washington DC and Singapore: East-West Center and ISEAS, 2007).

10 For a comparative approach which demonstrates that political grievances and militant mobilisation, rather than socio-economic issues, underpin similar conflicts, see Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2003).


© RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2009